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Imagine that a small private airplane crashed into your
living room. Your arm was broken, but thankfully, none of
your loved ones were hurt. You did have something of a sentimental attachment to your living room, which is now in
shambles. Times being what they are, you naturally look for
someone to sue. Unfortunately, the pilot of the plane was not
as lucky as you. Her demise eliminates one potential defendant. So you look to the manufacturer. It turns out the
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manufacturer went into bankruptcy last year, selling its business lock, stock and barrel to another company. Afterward, it
dissolved.
Except for the fact that the manufacturer no longer existsyour lawyer informs you-you would have had a good cause of
action against it. However, you might be able to recoverfrom
the company that acquired the business. Your prospects may
depend on any or all of the following: (i) the terms of sale
between the manufacturer and the acquirer, (ii) any order of
the bankruptcy court approving the sale, (iii) whether provision was made in bankruptcy for compensation of future crash
victims, (iv) whether the acquirer continues to make a version
of the same plane, (v) which state's law applies, and
(vi) whether you read the notice in the newspapers last year
announcing the manufacturer's bankruptcy and sale of its
business.
You scratchyour head.
"You" have a problem. You have a claim against a business that
is now defunct. Well, not exactly defunct. The business still exists.
But it is now owned by an entity different from the one that manufactured the airplane that changed your life. At the time of the manufacturer's bankruptcy and sale of its business, neither the manufacturer nor the acquirer knew of your existence. While they probably
anticipated that a certain number of planes would crash over time,
there would have been no way to identify you as a future crash victim
or to quantify your particular damages. One consequence of the sale
is that you may be left with no means of recovery. You may be surprised to find that there is "no great wrong" to be redressed.' At the
time of the sale, you were merely a future claimant.

'Cf. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 625 n.9 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), affd, Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp. (In re Piper
Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995). In the process of disallowing a $100,000,000
claim filed on behalf of future claimants, the court opined that no provision need be made for
them because there was "no 'great wrong' to be redressed. Id. Whereas in certain mass tort
cases, the court reasoned, manufacturers had produced and distributed products known to be
harmful, only a very small percentage of the debtor's extant fleet of aircraft would crash because of manufacturing or design defects. The now-famous Piper decision is more fully discussed infra Part III(C)(2).
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I. INTRODUCTION

While the term "future claim" came into vogue with the mass tort
cases, 2 future claims plagued the legal system long before asbestos
became a household word. Whenever a firm sells its business and
subsequently dissolves, it leaves behind potential liabilities that might
go unpaid.3 If the business is a manufacturing business, a product of
its manufacture may cause injury long after the enterprise is sold and
the original corporation has disappeared.4 The sale and dissolution
marks a day of reckoning among the acquirer of the business, the
selling or target firm, and its creditors and shareholders.5 Assets and
liabilities are valued and divvied up between acquirer and target, and
consideration is paid to the target. The target firm will then dissolve,
paying its creditors from the proceeds of the sale, distributing any
surplus to shareholders, and then disappearing. Future claims, however, defy facile treatment on the day of reckoning. "Future claims"
are those potential future products liabilities that exist on the day of
reckoning. The manufacturer's liability-creating conduct has already
occurred, but any harmful consequence has yet to appear.6
Ordinarily, when the business is sold-whether inside or outside
of bankruptcy-future claims are ignored. The future claimant and

2 See

generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Ac-

tion, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Wars]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Corruptionof the Class Action: The New Technology of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851
(1995) [hereinafter Coffee, The Corruptionof the Class Action]; Mark L Roe, Bankruptcy and
Mass Tort, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 846 (1984) [hereinafter Roe, Mass Tort].
3 While the firm could take one of several different forms, this Article assumes the firm's
use of the corporate form. The transactions that implicate future claims and successor liability
are almost always between corporations.
4 A similar problem involves future environmental liability under CERCLA, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675
(1994), and similar state statutes. See generally Michael D. Green, Successors and CERCLA:
The Imperfect Analogy to ProductsLiability and an Alternative Proposal,87 Nw. U. L. REV.
897 (1993) [hereinafter Green, Successors and CERCLA]; Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental
Obligationsin Bankruptcy: A FundamentalFramework, 44 FLA. L. REv. 153 (1992). While
future environmental liabilities lend themselves to analysis similar to future products liability,
this Article will focus on the latter, and the term "future claim" will refer to future products
liability claims only.
- Cf Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for CorporateReorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
STuD. 127, 127 (1986) [hereinafter Baird, The Uneasy Case] (describing bankruptcy as "a day
of reckoning for all parties with ownership interests in an insolvent firm").
6 For example, the defective manufacture of an aircraft and its release into commerce may
ultimately result in liability for the manufacturer. Any harm, however, may arise only decades
after the manufacture of the aircraft See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
7 At the time of sale, future tort injuries may not even have been contemplated. However,
in many cases, the nature of the product-related injuries at issue were or could reasonably have
been anticipated at the time of sale. See, e.g., Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
of Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573 (1lth Cir. 1995)
(involving future plane crashes); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Savage Arms, Inc. (In re Savage
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her future injuries are not vivid to the corporate tortfeasor, the acquirer, or any other relevant observer. 8 At the time of sale and dissolution, it may be difficult to estimate the aggregate amount of future
liability. It may not be possible even to identify, or describe except in
general terms, the individuals who may later suffer injury. 9 They may
be ascertainable only years after the business has been sold. A future
claimant's rights are considered only in retrospect-that is, when her
injury occurs-if at all.
Consider the future claimant's precarious position. The day of
reckoning may have come and gone without her knowledge. She may
not have known about the sale and dissolution. Even if she had
known, she may have had absolutely no relationship or connection
with the manufacturing firm at the time of sale. Even if she had had
some connection-for example, as a consumer of its product-she
may not have imagined that she could become an obligee of the
manufacturer. She would not have been concerned about the day of
reckoning or any possible effect of the sale and dissolution on her
abstract legal rights. And even if she had understood in the abstract
that her legal rights might be affected, she would not likely have
taken any action. Given the remoteness of any possible injury, she
would not have made a claim or invested resources to participate in
any available legal process. 10 As a practical matter, the future claimIndus., Inc.), 43 F.3d 714 (1st Cir. 1994) (involving defective firearm); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560
P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977) (involving defective ladder).
8See generally RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 43-62 (1980) (finding that cognitive processes tend to
lead us to overemphasize information that is most concrete and "vivid"); Roe, Mass Tort, supra
note 2, at 855 (noting society's willingness to spend more on current identifiable victims and
less on future statistical victims despite expert consensus that dollars are better spent on latter);

Thomas A. Smith, A CapitalMarkets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J. 367,
383 (1994) (noting in the mass tort context that "[piresent claimants have powerful psychological advantages over future claimants in their battle to maximize their share of the debtor's estate. Present claimants in mass tort bankruptcies are identifiable persons with urgent medical
and financial needs, while future claimants are only statistical probabilities."); Shelley E. Taylor
& Suzanne C. Thompson, Stalking the Elusive "Vividness" Effect, 89 PSYCHOL. REV. 155
(1982) (questioning evidence supporting vividness effect, but proposing salience-vividness
effect to explain differential impact of vivid information under conditions of information competition).
9The universe of plane crash victims, for example, is not limited to owners or passengers.
It would therefore be impossible to identify, even in general terms, the class of persons who
might ultimately suffer injury from a defective airplane. Similarly, the entire universe of individuals who have ever been exposed to asbestos fibers would also be difficult to capture, given
the once pervasive use of asbestos as an insulating material in construction. See infra note 100
and accompanying text.
10If at the time of sale and dissolution, an individual's chances of ultimately sustaining injury are low, it may be difficult to convince her to invest resources today in a proceeding that
will affect her, if ever, only years into the future. The expected value to any given individual of
such an investment is likely negative, even if any ultimate injury might be severe. See Roe,
Mass Tort, supra note 2, at 898-99 ("Individuals... often disregard serious risks that have a low
probability of occurring."); Alan Schwartz, ProductsLiability, CorporateStructure, and Bank-
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ant will have had no opportunity to assert her rights and to be counted
on the day of reckoning.
Much may be at stake in whether unknown future tort creditors are

compensated. The phenomenon of long-tail products liability is now
commonplace."

With modem design, engineering and materials,

many is the product that will stay in circulation long after its original
manufacturer has sold its business and disappeared. 12 In addition,
modern production and distribution enable widespread sale and use of
a product long before harmful effects may become apparent to the
public. 13 There may have been a day when the possibility of future
ruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 725-26
(1985) (discussing disincentives for future claimants to trigger manufacturer's bankruptcy); see
also RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANK-

RUPTCY 107-15 (1991) (describing debate over whether notice to future claimants concerning
claims bar date in bankruptcy could ever be adequate, given that future claimants in perfect
health at time of notice would likely fail to appreciate its significance and would not likely file
proof of claim).
" See generally Green, Successors and CERCLA, supranote 4, at 904-06 (discussing longtail products and environmental liabilities and inadequacy of traditional corporate law dissolution statutes in dealing with them); Kathryn R. Heidt, The Changing Paradigm of Debt, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1055 (1994) [hereinafter Heidt, ChangingParadigm](describing "extraordinary
liabilities" in bankruptcy); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorancein the Manufacture of Toxic
Products,82 CORNELL L. REV. 773 (1997) (describing dearth of even minimal level of safety
research concerning long-term health effects of chemicals widely used in commerce, and incentives under current law for manufacturers not to perform such research but, rather, to build
litigation defense strategies around ignorance).
12At the time of the Piper Aircraft bankruptcy, there were an estimated 95,000 Piper planes
still in existence worldwide, and the average age of a Piper aircraft still flying was twenty-four
years. See Amended Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code
with Respect to the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of the Debtor, the
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Piper Aircraft Corporation, Newco Pac, Inc.,
Teledyne Industries, Inc. and Dimeling, Schreiber and Park, In re Piper Aircraft Corp., (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1994) (No. 91-31884-BKC-RAM) [hereinafter Piper Disclosure Statement]; see also
Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986) (involving 1983 accident with machine
manufactured in 1969); In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92, 100 (Del. Ch. 1992) (noting actuarial
forecasts showing that future claims involving industrial valve products would arise for twenty
to thirty years following dissolution); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1981) (involving 1972 accident with machine manufactured in 1957). As one writer noted:
Insurance industry statistics... suggest that only thirty percent of expected general
liability claims (which include products liability) are reported three years after the
initial policy year and only sixty percent are reported after the eighth year. Not until
thirteen years after the initial policy year are seventy-five percent of the losses
known to the insurer. The balance of these losses develop over the next two decades.
Mark R. Sarlitto, Note, Recognizing ProductsLiability Claims at Dissolution: The Compatibility of Corporate and Tort Law Principles, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1052 (1987) (citing
REINSURANCE ASS'N OF AMERICA, LOSS DEVELOPMENT STUDY: 1985 EDITION 5 (1985)).

13 The latency period for asbestos-produced disease may run as long as forty years. See
Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion DollarCrisis, 30 HARV. J.

ON LEGIS. 383, 387-88 (1993).

When businesses purposefully conceal harmful effects after their discovery, the problem is
of course exacerbated. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS

INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 141-46 (1985) (claiming that executives of Johns-Manville and other asbestos producers actively suppressed evidence of harmful effects of exposure); SOBOL, supra
note 10, at 1-22 (chronicling A.H. Robins's history of ignoring safety research showing dangers
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products liability claims caused little concern when a business was
sold. Insignificant in terms of both number and severity, such future
claims may simply not have been worth worrying about. 14 That day,
however, has passed.
While this Article focuses primarily on bankruptcy sales, it begins
with a discussion of sales outside the bankruptcy context, providing
background for the subsequent formulation of a bankruptcy prescription. Outside of bankruptcy, courts devised a rule of successor liability that attempts to strike a rough accommodation of competing interests. When applicable, this rule allows the future claimant to recover
from the acquirer if the manufacturer is unavailable. However, only a
minority of states have adopted this rule, and it offers only sporadic
relief to future claimants."
The proper treatment of future claims in bankruptcy is likewise an
unsettled question among both courts and commentators. Courts have
struggled over two fundamental issues: (1) whether a future claimant
qualifies as a "creditor" whose rights may be affected by bankruptcy
generally, and (2) whether authority may be found in the Bankruptcy
Code to extinguish future claimants' successor liability rights following a bankruptcy sale. The confusion should not surprise. The
courts have been left with the unenviable task of apportioning losses,
both realized and remote, in the face of scarce resources and with little statutory guidance.
Unlike the courts, bankruptcy theorists agree on several fundamental points. They agree that future claims may appropriately be
handled as part of the bankruptcy process-that is, included as bankruptcy claims. Further, if the bankruptcy results in a sale of the business, then provided future claimants' rights are recognized in bankruptcy, their successor liability rights should be extinguished. 16
However, theorists disagree as to the universality of the bankruptcy model. They disagree as to whether future claims must always
be included in bankruptcy, 17 or whether their inclusion should depend

associated with use of Dalkon Shield); Wagner, supra note 11, at 823-24 (describing concealment of adverse safety testing results in marketing of breast implants and tobacco, as well as
asbestos and Dalkon Shield).
14 Providing for recoveries to future claimants would have been relatively expensive when
compared with the amount of accident costs that would otherwise have been left unsatisfied. Cf
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 214 (4th ed. 1992) (explaining that the

traditional corporate law rule of no successor liability "reflects a time when delayed tort consequences were less common than they are today, so that the transaction costs of successorship
liability dominated the externalization of accident costs").
" See infra Part II.
16See infra notes 202, 228-31 and accompanying text.
17 See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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on the debtor's discretionl 8 -what I refer to as the "flexible" approach. Ironically, at a time when some scholars have called for fundamental corporate and commercial law reform to protect tort claimants from the liability avoidance that existing rules permit,1 9 certain
bankruptcy commentators-including the National Bankruptcy Conference ("NBC") and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
("NBRC") 2 0 -advocate a more instrumental approach, content to ignore future tort claims in bankruptcy if the needs of the debtor and
current creditors so require.
In this Article, I propose a two-part prescription for the proper disposition of future claims when a business is sold in bankruptcy. First,
I argue that in a bankruptcy proceeding through which a business is
sold, future claims must be included and treated on a par with other
unsecured creditors. Second, provided future claimants' rights are
thus recognized in bankruptcy, any related successor liability rights
must be extinguished.
This Article makes three related contributions to the existing literature. First, I show that in the bankruptcy sale context, leaving to
the debtor's discretion the decision whether to include future claims
merely enables future claimants' exploitation. 21 For the most part,
neither advocates for the flexible approach nor for mandatory inclusion of future claims have focused on the bankruptcy sale context and
its exploitive potential.
Second, I argue that bankruptcy courts do and should have the
power to enjoin successor liability claims following a bankruptcy sale
in which future claimants' rights are respected. I assert that such an
injunction is the functional equivalent in a going concern bankruptcy
sale to the Chapter 11 discharge in internal reorganization, and therefore that such an injunction is within the inherent equitable powers of
bankruptcy courts.
Finally, I tackle the practical implications of the scheme I advocate. Recognizing that for many debtors, the current "traditional" approach to treatment of future claims-pioneered in the mass tort
18See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
19See infra note 237 and accompanying text. The approach advocated herein assumes the
current state of corporate limited liability and creditor priority rules. This Article also takes no
position with respect to the common law tort system as a method of setting and delivering compensation,
but for present purposes takes the current system as given.
20
See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
21Future claims may also be included when the business is internally reorganized. However, a flexible approach may be acceptable in internal reorganization. See infra notes 145-46
and accompanying text. The sale context will be this Article's primary focus, because it more
strongly implicates liability avoidance concerns. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcies-may generate transaction costs disproportionate to the
amounts at stake, I introduce an approach I call Commensurate Discounted Assumption ("CDA"), in which the acquirer assumes at a
discount the debtor's liability for future claims. This approach sidesteps the uncertainty of the formal estimation that is critical to the
traditional approach and avoids some of the costs of that approach.
Part I1provides background. In it, I first describe the successor liability doctrine. Then I describe bankruptcy reorganization and bankruptcy sales. In Part IT, I discuss inclusion of future claims in reorganization. I describe the mass tort cases, in which future claims
have been included, and contrast them with ordinary cases, in which
future claims are typically ignored. I discuss the impetus behind the
flexible approach and criticize its application to the bankruptcy sale
context. In Part IV, I describe the bankruptcy power to extinguish
successor liability claims. In Part V, I comment on the practical implications of the scheme I advocate and discuss possible approaches,
including my CDA approach.
II. BACKGROUND

Careful structuring of the sale of an enterprise may enable corporate planners to free the business from the claims of future tort
victims, allowing the acquirer and the seller's shareholders to
share the gains from this "laundering" of assets. 22 Such sales occur both within and outside of bankruptcy. This Part first describes the predicament of future claimants outside of bankruptcy
and the common law doctrine of successor liability that emerged to
address their special vulnerability. This Part then describes bankruptcy reorganization and introduces the problem of future claims
in the bankruptcy sale context.
A. Form and Substance in the Sale of a Business
Corporate planners structuring the sale of a business have two
standard transactional models from which to choose-the merger and
the sale of assets. 23 Each has its own benefits and costs. The structuring of a given transaction has important consequences for credi-

22 See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
2 There are, of course, infinite variations on the standard models. See generally RONALD J.
GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQuISrrIONS 641,
728 (2d ed. 1995) (dedicating a chapter to explaining the multiple techniques for acquisitions).
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tors, shareholders and other stakeholders of both acquirer and target, 24
as well as for the public fisc.25 From the planner's perspective, one
benefit from the sale of assets structure is its potential to free the
business from liability to future tort claimants.
The merger device provides a neat and tidy "off the rack' method
of acquisition that tends to minimize disruption of the existing legal
and other relationships of the corporations involved*26 In the standard
merger, the acquiring company pays consideration to the shareholders
of the target company in exchange for the target's business, and the
target company merges into the acquirer. The acquirer as the surviving entity succeeds to the assets and liabilities of the target by operation of law.2 7 The legal existence of the target company ends as a
result of the merger, but the surviving company remains liable to the
target's creditors.28
The tidiness of this arrangement presents drawbacks, however, if
the acquirer wishes to be selective about which assets of the target it
will acquire or which liabilities it will assume. If the acquirer wants
the lock and stock but not the barrel, then an asset sale may be the
preferred acquisition technique. Under this arrangement, the acquirer
purchases selected assets from-and may assume particular liabilities
of-the target. This technique may be useful in enabling the acquirer
to avoid, or at least minimize, exposure to certain of the target's
creditors,2 9 an option not available under the merger form.
When the acquirer buys the assets of its target, generally only the
assets transfer. The liabilities do not automatically follow. The ac24

See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Casefor Takeover Reform: An Essay on

Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 435 (discussing use of state antitakeover legislation to protect stakeholders from effects of corporate takeovers).
2

See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF

CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 14 (6th ed. 1994) (discussing tax consequences for
different
forms of acquisitions).
26
See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 23, at 642.
At one moment two corporations exist; at the next, the acquiring corporation has
enveloped the target, like an amoeba engulfing its prey, and has succeeded to all of
its properties, rights and other attributes. The technique has significant advantages
in reducing the transaction costs associated with the mechanical aspects of accomplishing an acquisition.... The effect of statutory [merger] provisions... is to substitute a single document, the merger agreement, for the flood of paper that would
otherwise be required to effect the transaction.
Id.
27 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1107 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 259(a) (1997);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.06(a)(3) (1994).
28 "A statutory merger provides the most protection.... [C]reditors of the target company
are protected because the surviving company in a merger assumes as a matter of law all of the
target's liabilities, including unknown or contingent liabilities." GILSON & BLACK, supra
note 23, at 1503.
29Mergers also implicate shareholder consent requirements and other protections, which
may give corporate planners further incentive to avoid mergers in favor of asset sales. See id.
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quirer, a legal entity separate and distinct from the target, does not
succeed to the target's liabilities absent specific agreement otherwise. 30 As a matter of economic substance, a business enterprise may
be transferred, but the liabilities associated with that business remain
with the target firm, absent some exception to this general rule.3 1
By itself, the asset sale does nothing to prejudice the target's
creditors. As long as the target entity receives fair consideration for
its assets and remains in existence to satisfy its liabilities, creditors of
the target have nothing to fear. However, once a target entity sells its
business, it typically will dissolve. With no business left to operate,
the target entity has no further reason to exist. Because it is left with
only the sale consideration-usually cash, marketable securities or
some combination-the target will dissolve, paying its known creditors and distributing any remaining assets to its shareholders.
The typical state corporation statute requires only that the dissolving corporation pay or provide for its known debts as a condition
to dissolution. 32 Unknown claims at the time of dissolution-in particular, future products liability claims-may be prejudiced by the
dissolution.33 The corporate tortfeasor has disappeared, and the
shareholders who received the corporation's surplus are largely immune to suit. While states generally provide a post-dissolution period
within which suit may be brought, 34 and shareholders may be required
30

See id.

31 As Professor Carlson has noted, "[C]orporate lawyers soon learned that by avoiding

mergers and substituting sales of assets instead, the assets of a debtor might be laundered and its
creditors' claims against the buyer effectively eliminated." David Gray Carlson, Successor
Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of Intertemporal CreditorPrioritiesCreatedby
Running Covenants, Products Liability, and Toxic-Waste Cleanup, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 119,127 (1987).
3
2 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2004 (West 1990); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.06 cmL
(1994).
33Claims that have not arisen under state law at the time of dissolution are generally not
considered known debts. See Pefiasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154, 161 (Cal. 1991)
(citing Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1977)); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT § 14.06
cmt. (1994) ("[A] claim that is contingent or has not matured so that there is no immediate right

to bring suit is not a 'known' claim.").
3 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011 (a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1999) (four years); DEL. CODE
8, § 278 (1997) (three years); MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 14.07(c) (1994) (requiring for
ANN. tit.
unknown claim that suit be brought within five years from date of publication notice of dissolution).
Delaware now provides incrementally more protection for unknown creditors. Upon dissolution, provision must be made that will "be reasonably likely to be sufficient' to compensate
unknown claims that "based on facts known to the corporation ... are likely to arise or to become known... within 10 years after the date of dissolution." DEL. CODE ANN. tiL 8, § 281(b)
(1997). The dissolved corporation may, during the winding up process, petition the Chancery
Court for a determination concerning the proper amount and form of security to satisfy the
above prescription. The court determination process also holds out the possibility of shortening
the "tail" period to five years. See id. § 280(c)(3). The court may appoint a guardian ad litem to
represent unknown claimants, with the guardian's reasonable fees and expenses paid by the
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to disgorge post-dissolution distributions in satisfaction of such suits,
this liability is typically limited. A shareholder will be liable only for
the lesser of (1) the amount of any distribution received and (2) her
pro rata share of the late-appearing creditor's claim. 35 This limitation,
along with the costs of pursuing individual shareholders-locating
them, fighting possible jurisdictional issues, judgment-proof defen36
dants-makes this an unattractive prospect for future tort victims.
In any particular enterprise, the aggregate amount of future tort liability may be large enough to worry about. Therefore, in structuring
these types of transactions, purchasers and sellers have incentive to
avoid future liabilities. 37 Even absent opportunism on the part of purchasers and sellers, the pervasiveness of long-tail liabilities suggests
that the aggregate liability-avoiding effects of corporate dissolution
may be significant.
B. Successor Liability
Into this breach stepped the courts, or at least some of them. Over
time, these courts developed enterprise-based approaches to address
liability avoidance through asset sale,38 crafting exceptions to the basic rule that the acquirer of assets does not inherit the target's liabilities. These exceptions, the "business continuation" exception and the

petitioning corporation. See id.; see also In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92 (Del. Ch. 1992) (deciding
the first case involving a challenge to dissolution plan under predecessor to current statute).
Even an extended tail period, however, may prove ineffective to provide substantial coverage for future products liability claimants. See supranotes 12-13 and accompanying text.
3- See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 282 (1997); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.07(d) (1994).
36 Other possible avenues of recovery from shareholders are likewise unattractive. See
Mark J. Roe, Mergers,Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 VA. L. REv. 1559, 1564 n.15 (1984) [hereinafter Roe, Successor Liability]
(describing difficulties with common law trust fund and fraudulent conveyance theories).
37 The existence of such incentives will of course vary from industry to industry, depending
on the tort-generating potential of the business. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE LJ. 1, 44-45 (1996) [hereinafter LoPucki, The Death of Liability] (discussing
varying incentives to judgment-proof from industry to industry); George L. Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisisand Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (1987) (identifying particular
industries and products-vaccines, general aviation aircraft, sports equipment and ski lift operations, among others-subject either to drastically rising insurance premiums or unavailability of
coverage at any price).
38Courts have been willing under some circumstances to view enterprises rather than entities as the operative units for imposition of liability. See PHILLiP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF
CORPORATE GROUPS § 18.02 (1985) (describing with approval evolution from entity principles
to enterprise principles in many areas of law); Phillip I. Blumberg, The IncreasingRecognition
of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28
CONN. L. REV. 295, 344 (1996) (citing development of successor liability law as example of
growing application of enterprise principles in American law). However, as with other entitybased liability-avoiding strategies, the law will "disregard entities only in extreme circumstances." LoPucki, The Death of Liability, supranote 37, at 67.
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"product line" exception, 39 allow suit against the acquirer by the
claimant, unknown at the time of the acquisition, who suffers injury
from a product manufactured by the target-that is, the predecessor
owner. 4° In this way, a means of recovery is provided to the future
claimant.
1. The Doctrine
While the business continuation doctrine and the product line
doctrine differ in their origins,4 ' they share the basic idea that if there
is economic continuity of the enterprise in the acquirer's hands, then
the acquirer should inherit the manufacturer's strict products liability.42 Economic continuity means that the substantive effect of the
sale is simply to change ownership of the business. Successor liability assures that this enterprise can not duck future tort liabilities
through an ownership change. Structuring the transaction as an asset

39Other exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of the asset acquirer have been recognized where (a) the asset sale is deemed a fraudulent attempt to evade creditors; (b) the purchasing corporation is a mere continuation of the selling corporation; or (c) the acquirer agrees,
either explicitly or implicitly, to assume the target's liabilities. See Knapp v. North American
Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). See generally
15 STEPHEN M. FLANAGAN, ET AL,

FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE

CORPORATIONS § 7122, at 231 (1991); Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority
of Statutory Reform to ProtectProductsLiability Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 17, 22 (1986)
[hereinafter Green, Statutory Reform]; Jerry J. Phillips, ProductLine Continuity and Successor
CorporationLiability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906, 908 (1983) [hereinafter J. Phillips, ProductLine
Continuity].
My focus is on the difficult case, that of the bona fide arn's-length enterprise sale between unaffiliated parties where the acquirer does not agree to assume future tort liabilities.
40 The terms "predecessor," "manufacturer" and "target" are used interchangeably, depending on the context, to refer to the entity that manufactured the product that later causes
harm to the future claimant.
41See generally Green, Statutory Reform, supra note 39, at 22-26 (describing common law
development
of successor liability).
42
See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8 (Cal. 1977) (describing successor's ability to
assume original manufacturer's role in spreading risk of defective products); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.V.2d 873, 881 (Mich. 1976) (same). As the appellate court stated in
Cyrv. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974):
The very existence of strict liability for manufacturers implies a basic judgment that
the hazards of predicting and insuring for risk from defective products are better
borne by the manufacturer than by the consumer. The manufacturer's successor, carrying over the experience and expertise of the manufacturer, is likewise in a better
position than the consumer to gauge the risks and the costs of meeting them. The
successor knows the product, is as able to calculate the risk of defects as the predecessor, is in position to insure therefor and reflect such cost in sale negotiations, and
is the only entity capable of improving the quality of the product.
Id. at 1154.
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sale, as opposed to a merger or stock sale,43 will not eliminate these
liabilities.

The two approaches differ with respect to the indicia relied
upon to determine the requisite economic continuity justifying im-

position of successor liability. The business continuation theory
essentially adopts a totality of circumstances test, considering such
factors as continuity of management or key personnel, continuity
of assets or general business operations, retention of the same
name andproduct, and the acquirer's purchase of the predecessor's
goodwill. The product line theory instead turns on the acquirer's
continuation of the target's product line-its "undertaking to
manufacture
essentially the same line of products as the predeces45
sor.

43With a sale of stock, although the identity of the owners changes, the corporate form of
the business remains unchanged, unlike the case of acquisition by merger or asset sale. Therefore, the sale of stock does not affect the liabilities of the target corporation.
44See, e.g., Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1152 (stating factors considered in business continuation theory); MacCleery v. T.S.S. Retail Corp., 882 F. Supp. 13, 17 (D.N.H. 1994) (listing a series of
factors in determining successor liability under a business continuation theory); Shannon v.
Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp 797, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (describing circumstances
where sufficient business continuity will be found); see also J. Phillips, ProductLine Continuity, supra note 39, at 918-19 (describing business continuation theory).
This exception grew out of the de facto merger doctrine of corporate law, in which the primary focus was shareholder protection. Whereas statutory mergers typically require approval
by shareholders of the constituent corporations and provide dissenters rights, corporate planners
attempted to avoid these protections by structuring business combinations as asset sales instead.
The acquirer would issue its own stock as consideration for the target's assets. The target would
then dissolve, distributing this consideration to its own shareholders. As a result, the acquirer
swallowed the target's business, and the target's former shareholders became shareholders of
the aequirer. Because the end result was the same as a stock merger, courts created the doctrine
of de facto merger in order to afford the acquirer's shareholders the same protections to which
they would have been entitled in the case of a statutory merger. See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden
Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958) (holding that stock-for-assets acquisition constituted de facto
merger, triggering shareholder rights of dissent). Courts then imported this approach into the tort
area, deeming certain business combinations the functional equivalent of statutory mergers, such
that the acquirer should succeed to the target's future tort liabilities. See Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974 ), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) (discussing
corporate law genesis of de facto merger doctrine, and imposing successor liability in stock-forassets acquisition). From there, it was a relatively small step to the conclusion that in the tort
context, the merger analogy should apply regardless of whether the sale consideration is stock or
cash. See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976) (holding that liability does not turn on the form of the acquisition).
This concept is often stated as two distinct exceptions to the general rule of nonliability"business continuation" and "de facto merger." However, the exceptions tend to overlap. "[N
criteria can be identified that distinguish them in any useful manner. In each instance, the central issue is whether the purchasing corporation effectively has become the selling corporation
by acquiring not only the latter's assets but also its entire business." J. Phillips, Product Line
Continuity, supranote 39, at 909; see also George L. Lenard, Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations:A Policy Analysis, 58 IND. L.J. 677, 699-700 (1983) (noting substantial
overlap between de facto merger and continuation theories).
45Ramirez v. Amsted, 431 A.2d 811, 819 (N.J. 1980).
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2. Assessment
Although successor liability provides compensation to otherwise
hapless future tort claimants, it has generated much controversy as to
both its theoretical justifications46 and its practical consequences.
Even defenders of the doctrine note its shortcomings, 47 and its adoption has been far from universal. 48
Successor liability generates uncertainty and increased costs in
business dealings, which may inhibit economically desirable transactions-that is, transfers that place assets into more productive hands. 49
If the amount and timing of future liabilities are difficult to predict,
prospective acquirers will be discouraged. 50 Even if future liabilities
could be determined with precision and without cost, the rule may

force piecemeal liquidation of otherwise healthy businesses.

Any

acquirer will naturally discount its purchase price for the business to
account for successor liability risk. If this "successor liability dis-

4For a comprehensive survey and critique of proffered conceptual justifications for successor liability, see Green, Statutory Reform, supra note 39, at 28-40.
47See id.
at 41-49 (advocating dissolution-restricting statute as superior alternative to successor liability on numerous grounds).
48 See Green, Successors and CERCLA, supra note 4, at 908-10 (chronicling
the "emergence and demise" of liberal successor products liability doctrine, noting at the time that (1)
only four state supreme courts had adopted liberal successor liability rules, (2) six state supreme
courts rejected the same between 1985 and 1988, and (3) "virtually every other state court encountering the issue declined to adopt a liberal successor liability rule"). Prognostication of the
death of successor liability may have been premature, however. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
4 See Green, Successors and CERCLA, supra note 4, at 908-10. See generally LoPucki,
The Death of iability,supranote 37. Professor LoPucki notes:
Whether [an enterprise-based] approach [to assigning liability] could be viable depends on whether there are in fact identifiable, stable boundaries between enterprises.
If there are, the courts could discover them on a case-by-case basis. If there are not,
the courts would be assigning liability arbitrarily and generating probably intolerable
uncertainty for investors.
Id. at 67. Professor LoPucki concludes that a full-blown enterprise liability system is not a
workable alternative to an entity-based system that occasionally disregards entities. See id. at
'69.
50 The costs of estimating future liabilities and any uncertainty with respect to such estimates will deter prospective acquirers:
The potential imposition of unwanted liability is likely to complicate bargaining and
raise transaction costs by requiring the buyer to investigate carefully the future liability it may face. Indeed, the threat of successor liability may cause some negotiations to fail when, for example, the seller's records of products extant prove incomplete and the buyer cannot make a reasonable estimate of the costs that it would face.
Steven H. Schulman, Commentary: Successor CorporationLiability and the Inadequacy of the
ProductLine Continuity Approach, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 142 (1984); see also Roe, Successor Liability, supra note 36, at 1561 (noting that successor liability might result in "assets [being] caged in the hands of a demoralized and disabled management that is unable to sell its
operations to a higher-valuing and perhaps more capable user").
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count" exceeds the operational value of a business, 5 1 the business will
be unmarketable as a going concern. 52 The target would have to pay
the acquirerto take the business! Absent bankruptcy, the only alternative to continuing the business would be piecemeal liquidation. 3
Successor liability, then, provides a blunt and imperfect approach
to addressing future claims. Although it offers some hope of recovery
for future claimants, this hope comes at some cost. While the controversy over the rule has prevented its widespread adoption, the rule
may nevertheless be cause for concern among manufacturers and ac-

quirers. It is a viable theory of recoveg in several significant statesDepending on the product,
including California and New York.
manufacturers and acquirers will ordinarily have no ability to control-and may have little ability to predict-where products will be

used or which state's law will apply to any given future products liability action. Ultimately, successor liability leaves unclear signals
for manufacturers and acquirers and provides only spotty protection
for future claimants.
C. Bankruptcy Reorganizationand Bankruptcy Sales
Going concern asset sales occur in bankruptcy as well as outside,
with the same potentially preclusive effect on future claimants' rights.
The target in bankruptcy will attempt to sell the business "free and
clear" of successor liability, relying on the bankruptcy system to
cleanse the assets of any taint of future claims liability.

51By "operational value," I mean the going concern value of the operating assets, without

consideration of non-operating liabilities such as future tort liabilities.
52See Roe, Successor Liability, supranote 36, at 1568.
53 See Green, Statutory Reform, supra note 39, at 42. On the other hand, the incremental
costs ofa rule of successor liability may be overstated. For example, with respect to uncertainty
and costs of estimating future tort liabilities, presumably the acquirer would undertake some
degree of investigation in any event. Moreover, a rule of no successor liability also has costs.
Tort victims are forced to bear losses that may be difficult, if not impossible, to spread. Under
such a regime, the predecessor also has perverse incentives to sell the business. Although the
predecessor may be the most efficient user of its assets, selling enables liability avoidance that
would otherwise be unavailable.
54To date, the supreme courts of at least five states-including California, Michigan and
New Jersey-have explicitly adopted successor liability. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3
(Cal. 1977); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976); Ramirez v.
Amsted, 431 A.2d 811 (NJ. 1980); Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243 (N.M. 1997); Martin
v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984). In addition, it has received approval of lower
courts in New York and Pennsylvania. See Hart v Bruno Machinery Corp., 1998 N.Y. Slip Op.
09487, 1998 WL 770354 (N.Y. App. Div.) (applying product line exception); Hill v. Trailmobile, Inc., 603 A.2d 602 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (same); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d
106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (discussing both business continuation and product line exceptions
and explicitly adopting the latter).
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1. Reorganizationand the Common Pool
Bankruptcy is meant to solve a common pool problem among
creditors. 55 It provides a mechanism for collective settlement of the
debtor's multiple obligations in one proceeding, through which losses
are distributed among creditors. Individual creditor collection efforts
are halted in favor of this collective proceeding, which attempts to
maximize recoveries for creditors as a group.
The classic common pool problem involves a scarce resourcesay, a pond filled with fish-shared among multiple parties.
Individual and group interests may diverge as to the use of the shared
resource. For each individual with access to the pond, it might serve
her individual interest to harvest as many fish as she can, as fast as
she can. But the group would probably be better off setting limits on
each individual's catch. If the parties could coordinate and enforce
limits on their individual harvesting, they could assure that enough
fish remained in the pond to repopulate it indefinitely. The group
could assure itself a perpetual source of fish.
However, the parties might be unable to coordinate their decisionmaking. Or they might be unable to enforce any collective decision.
If the group is unable to limit each individual's harvest, then it makes
sense for each individual to pursue her own self-interest. 56This leads,
unfortunately, to the destruction of the pond as a resource.
In bankruptcy, the debtor's assets are the common pool. Creditors
are the parties with access to the common pool once the debtor is in
financial distress. Absent imposition of bankruptcy's collective proceeding, under state law collection rules, the debtor's assets are divvied on a first-come, first-served basis. Creditors race against each
other to seize assets in satisfaction of their respective debts.57 While
the speedy creditor may do well, creditors as a group are worse off
than if they could coordinate their collection efforts, which is usually

55 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCL 1243 (1968) (describing ruination of shared resources from individual pursuit of self-interested ends).
Whether this is the goal or only one among several possibly competing goals is subject to
debate. CompareDouglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, CorporateReorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHL L. REv. 97, 100-01 (1984) (asserting that core purpose of
bankruptcy law is to reduce costs associated with diverse ownership interests in debtor), with
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336
(1993) (describing multiple and competing policy goals of the bankruptcy system).
5' See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMnTs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10-13 (1986)

[hereinafter JACKSON, LoGIC AND LiMrrs] (describing bankruptcy as a device to solve common
pool problems among creditors).
5

1 see ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND

CREDrrORS 69 (3d ed. 1996) (describing creditors' race of diligence under state law).
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impossible under state law.58 The race to the debtor's assets results in
piecemeal dismemberment of the debtor's business, forsaking going
concern value that could have been applied to satisfy creditor
claims.
Chapter 11 reorganization coordinates collection activity in order
to benefit creditors as a group. It attempts to maximize creditor recoveries by preserving the going concern value of the business. The
debtor's management remains in place,6° authorized to continue ordinary course operations, 6' while creditors and the debtor negotiate a
66 must approve any plan,63 but for
plan of reorganization. 62 Creditors
the duration of the case, the automatic stay precludes individual
creditor collection efforts against the estate. 64 The confirmed plan
serves as the blueprint for the reorganized debtor's capital structure,
specifying what each creditor receives in consideration for its claim.
Typical plan consideration will be either a new scaled-down claim
against the reorganized debtor, cash, or some combination. Creditors
must await confirmation of the plan in order to receive their plan consideration, which is their exclusive recovery from the estate. Upon
confirmation, all preconfirmation debts are discharged, 65 and creditors
are enjoined from pursuing the reorganized debtor on any preconfirmation debt.66
Two fundamental norms underlie this system of loss distribution:
absolute priority and equal treatment. Under the absolute priority
rule, a class of unsecured claims or interests is not entitled to any
bankruptcy distribution unless and until each senior class either con-

59 See Daniel L. Keating, Getting a Handle on Late-Manifesting Claims: A Comment, 72

WASH U. L.Q. 1095, 1099 (1994) (describing transaction cost and holdout problems hindering
voluntary collective action under state law collection regime).
59 Even if there is no going concern value, such that piecemeal liquidation is the best disposition of the assets, an orderly liquidation will likely garner more proceeds overall than an uncoordinated fire sale.
60See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1994).
61 The debtor is authorized to use, sell, or lease assets of the estate in the ordinary course of
business (except for cash collateral). See id. §363(c). The debtor may also incur unsecured debt
in the ordinary course of business as an administrative expense. See id. §364(a).
62 See Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1684, 168999 (1996) (describing Chapter 11 plan negotiation).
63 Creditors vote by class. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c), 1129(a)(8) (1994).
64 See id. § 362. The bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor
6 5 in property as of the commencement of the case." Id. § 541(a)(1).
See id. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
66 See id. § 524(a).
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sents or is paid in full. 67 The rule of equal treatment requires that
similarly situated creditors receive equality of treatment.6 8
2. Future Claims and the Common Pool
Future claims present a unique challenge for bankruptcy's solution
to the common pool problem- 69 Given that the identities of future

claimants and the amounts and timing of their respective claims may
be difficult to ascertain at the time of bankruptcy, coordinating bankruptcy's collective settlement becomes quite complicated. As discussed below, incorporating future claims into the settlement may be
expensive in transaction cost terms.70 On the other hand, leaving

them out creates a holdout problem that bankruptcy is specifically
designed to cure.7 1 A collective settlement that fails to include future
claimants may be ineffective to preserve the value in the common
pool. A current claimant would naturally be reluctant to limit her
ability to grab assets if she knew that later arriving claimants would
not be so restricted. And even if she could be restrained from selfhelp indefinitely, the specter of unresolved future asset grabbers
might destroy going concern value today.72

3. The Bankruptcy Sale
Instead of reorganizing internally, the parties in interest may decide to sell the assets of the estate as a going concern. While we gen67See id. § 1129(b)(2)(B); see also Tung, supra note 62, at 1692-93 (explaining rule of ab-

solute priority).
6 See Begier v. Internal Revenue Service, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) ("Equality of distribution
among creditors is a central policy of the Bankruptcy Code. According to that policy, creditors
of equal priority should receive pro rata shares of the debtor's property.").
69Some have questioned the applicability of the common pool model to bankruptcy. See,
e.g., Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior,and Common Pools, 59 U. CHL L. REV.
645 (1992). Professor Picker notes that the classic common pool problem involves an overlapping distribution of rights among strangers, but that for the most part the debtor and its creditors
are not strangers. Their prebankruptcy relationships enable contracting that can minimize the
common pool problem. Therefore, according to Professor Picker, bankruptcy is more accurately
modeled as a small decision making problem embedded in a larger one-that is, an embedded
game-and not as a simple free-standing common pool problem. See id.at 647-49.
Future claimants, of course, are not voluntary creditors. They and the other involuntary
creditors have no real opportunity to negotiate their way around common pool problems. That
they are strangers to each other and to contract creditors suggests that the common pool model
continues to be useful. Cf Barry E. Adler, Financialand PoliticalTheories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1993) (explaining political basis for laws that effectively preclude creditors from contracting around common pool problem).
0See infra Part IH1(C).
71See JACKSON, LoGIc AND LIMITS, supranote 56, at 13 (noting collective and compulsory
nature
72 of bankruptcy proceeding); Keating, supranote 58, at 1099.
See infra note 99 and accompanying text for a description of the operational collapse that
may occur because of the existence of overhanging future liabilities that are not susceptible of
comprehensive settlement.
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erally conceive of the former as "reorganization" and the latter as
"liquidation," the two alternatives are not so dissimilar. In both cases,
going concern value is preserved while a new capital structure is created for the business. As Dean Baird and President Jackson have explained, one can conceptualize reorganization as a hypothetical sale
of the going concern to prepetition creditors, who "purchase" their
postbankruptcy
participations in the business with their prepetition
73
claims.
The primary difference between internal reorganization and the
going concern sale is simply the identity of the investors in the business at the end of the day. With internal reorganization, prepetition
creditors constitute the reorganized debtor's postpetition investors.
With the going concern sale, the common pool of estate assets is exchanged for cash (or securities or whatever other consideration is paid
for the business). Creditors relinquish their prepetition claims in return for shares of this new pool, and the third party purchaser owns
the business. 74 Cr&litors' claims are paid out of the sale consideration
in absolute priority order, respecting as well the rule of equal treatment.75 This going concern sale may therefore be conceived of as an
"external reorganization."
As is the case outside of bankruptcy, proceeds of the bankruptcy
sale, and therefore creditor recoveries, will be maximized if the going
concern is sold free of existing liabilities. The typical acquirer will
prefer to buy the business "clean," and the bankruptcy court will approve the sale "free and clear" of pre-bankruptcy liabilities. 76 However, if some of those pre-bankruptcy liabilities are future claims,
then the external reorganization scenario may implicate successor
liability concerns. As with asset sales outside of bankruptcy, future
claims are ordinarily ignored in external reorganization. How they
should be treated, and whether successor liability may survive a bankruptcy sale, are unsettled questions that are addressed, respectively, in
the next two Parts.
73 See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 56, at 210-11 (describing reorganization as
a form of asset sale); Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 5, at 127; see also Robert C. Clark,
The InterdisciplinaryStudy of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE LJ. 1238, 1250-54 (1981) (describing
evolution of modern reorganization statutes from collective liquidation procedures and equity
receiverships).
74 Hybrid outcomes are also not uncommon. A capital structure for a reorganizing entity
may include new investors as well as prepetition creditors. An outside acquirer could basically
buy the business via reorganization. Instead of an outright purchase of the assets, the acquirer
might make a capital contribution to the reorganizing debtor in exchange for some or all of the
reorganizing debtor's shares of common stock issued under the plan.
75 This sale and distribution typically occurs as part of a liquidating plan in Chapter 11.
Distribution of the proceeds occurs upon confirmation of the plan. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
6See infra Part IV(A).
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m. FUTURE CLAIMS IN REORGANIZATION
Proper treatment of future claims is an unsettled question in both
internal and external reorganization. In mass tort reorganizations,
where the sheer magnitude of future claims liability threatens the survival of a large company, future claims have been included in the
bankruptcy proceedings.77 However, outside of that context, future
claims are generally ignored.7 8 Structuring bankruptcy mechanisms
to address the rights of future claimants may be expensive relative to
the amounts at stake. 79 And even if future claimants are legally entitled to be included as creditors in bankruptcy-an issue that is unclear
under current law-at the time of bankruptcy, they are largely unaware of their rights and are not in a position to assert them.
Bankruptcy theorists agree, without focusing specifically on external reorganization, that future claims may be handled in bankruptcy. 80
However, they disagree as to whether future claims must always be
included,8 1 or whether their inclusion should depend on the discretion

of plan proponents 82
-- typically, the debtors. Under this latter "flexible approach," future claims excluded from the process would simply
retain their nonbankruptcy rights. 83 While including future claims in
7' See infra Part Ill(C)(1).
78See, e.g., Western Auto Supply Co. v. Savage Arms, Inc. (In re Savage Indus., Inc.), 43
F.3d 714 (1st Cir. 1994) (bankruptcy sale of firearms manufacturer that made no provision for
future claims); Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) (bankruptcy sale of aircraft manufacturer with no provision for future
claims in liquidating plan) vacated, 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998); see also Jeffrey
Davis, CrammingDown Future Claims in Bankruptcy: Fairness,Bankruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the Lessons of the PiperReorganization,70 AM. BANKR. hJ. 329,337 (1996) (noting
that prior to appearance of future claimants to assert their rights, "the threat of future claimants
had never seemed significant to warrant much attention by the reorganizing parties"). But see
Conway v. White Trucks, 885 F.2d 90,91 (3d Cir. 1989) (describing provision for future claims
in reorganization
plan).
79
For example, appointment of a special representative may be necessary in order to accord
due process to future claimants. See infra Part ImI(C)(1).
o See, e.g., Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 5, at 145-46; Carlson, supra note 31, at
145; Heidt, Changing Paradigm,supra note 11, at 1078; Thomas H. Jackson, TranslatingAssets and Liabilitiesto the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 96 (1985) [hereinafter
Jackson, TranslatingAssets and Liabilities];Keating, supra note 58, at 1097; Ralph R. Mabey
& Peter A. Zisser, Improving Treatment of Future Claims: The Unfinished Business Left by the
Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 487, 488 (1995) (asserting that bankruptcy court is
the "best forum" for mass tort future claims cases); see also REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE: THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEW PROJECT, FINAL REPORT
33-43 (rev. ed. 1997) [hereinafter NBC FINAL REPORT] (describing proposed treatment of future
claims in Chapter 11); 1 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMIsSION 322-23
(1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT] (same).
81See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
82
See NBC FINAL REPORT, supranote 80, at 37-38; NBRC REPORT, supra note 80, at 323;
Davis, supra note 78, at 361. For a description of these three reform proposals adopting the
flexible
83 approach, see infra note 93.
This point is not made explicit in the NBC FINAL REPORT. However, the report does note
the unfairness of insulating the reorganized concern from future claims without providing for
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reorganization comports with fundamental bankruptcy policies, a
flexible approach avoids having to incur the costs of addressing future
claims in those cases where it would not be cost-effective.
A flexible approach may be unobjectionable in some bankruptcy
contexts. However, I argue that in external reorganization, a flexible
approach merely enables exploitation of future claimants. If their
inclusion is optional, external reorganization becomes one more device by which an acquirer and residual claimants-here, current
creditors-conspire to leave disproportionate losses with future
claimants.
My prescription for proper treatment of future claims in external
reorganization has two components. First, future claims should always be included in the bankruptcy proceeding and receive equal
treatment with the debtor's other creditors. Second, as an incident to
inclusion of future claims, successor liability should be enjoined.
This Part discusses the first aspect of my prescription, as part of the
larger question of treatment of future claims in reorganization generally. I leave the discussion of successor liability to the next Part.
This Part begins by first explaining the conceptual basis for comprehensive inclusion of future claims, and then introducing the flexible approach. Next, I contrast the mass tort bankruptcies with the
ordinary cases, illustrating the transaction costs of addressing future
claims and the courts' struggle to align conceptual clarity with practical cost consequences. Finally, I focus on external reorganization. I
distinguish it from internal reorganization-the model more commonly conceived as "reorganization"--based on the differing consequences to future claimants of their exclusion from the proceedings. I
explain future claimants' more precarious position if excluded from
external reorganization. I assert that a flexible approach in external
reorganization fails to respect future claimants' rights as creditors, but
merely enables subversion of such rights.
A. Including Future Claims
It is a relatively uncontroversial proposition among bankruptcy
scholars that the bankruptcy system, if called upon, should be capable
of addressing future claims. 84 Dealing with future claims is consistent
with fundamental bankruptcy goals.
their payment. See NBC FINAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 36; see also Davis, supra note 78, at
363 (stating that future claims ignored in bankruptcy must be "left unaffected").
84 Whether the bankruptcy system is the ideal or best place to handle future claims is subject
to some debate. Compare Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 2, at 1457-61 (finding bankruptcy
reorganization superior to class action for resolving mass torts while protecting interests of
future claimants), and Mabey & Zisser, supra note 80, with Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in
Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy Courts Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1695
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Bankruptcy provides a clear demarcation between the debtor's
past and future. It marks a day of reckoning among the debtor and all
its obligees-including future claimants, as to whom the debtor's liability-creating conduct has already occurred and can not be unwound. Including future claims allows the debtor to make a clean
break with its past, while also allowing victims of the debtor's past
mistakes to share in the value available at the time of bankruptcy.
Judge Easterbrook describes this concept quite aptly:
Bankruptcy separates the past and future of an enterprise,
satisfying claims attributable to yesterday's activities out of
existing assets and thereby enabling business operations that
have positive value to carry on, unburdened by the sunk costs
of blunders that are beyond recall. By letting bygones be bygone, from the firm's perspective, while assuring some compensation to those who learn in the future that these bygones
caused them injury, a plan of reorganization . . . promotes
both productivity and compensation. Failing to satisfy, out of
assets available at the time of the petition, the claims of persons whose injury becomes manifest after the filing of the
petition, would simultaneously provide (other) creditors with
excessively large shares of the estate, and create a drag on
ongoing operations that could cause the dissolution of business ventures with positive cash flow (and thus potentially
substantial social and private value).85
Inability to include future claims in bankruptcy's collective settlement would tend to frustrate bankruptcy goals. Having to answer
for past mistakes outside of the collective proceeding would cause a
diversion of the reorganized debtor's cash and other resources, and
might ultimately imperil survival of the business. 86 Assuming the
(1998) (criticizing National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposal and bankruptcy approach
generally, questioning whether bankruptcy approach is truly an improvement over class action
approach).
8 In re lNR Indus. Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J.) (citations omitted).
86

A collective process that commences well before the damages or injuries develop
might be the only opportunity for future claimants to receive any compensation, both
because otherwise early claimants may take all the assets of the company or the
company's extraordinary potential liability will dry up access to all capital needed for
ongoing business operations.
NBRC REPORT, supra note 80, at 315; see also Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 5, at 145-46
(stating that when future tort victims' claims exceed firm's net worth, sale of business to third
party must be free of future tort liability in order to preserve going concern and maximize sale
proceeds, with tort victims sharing in sale proceeds); Heidt, Changing Paradigm,supra note 11,
at 1084 (arguing that failing to free debtor from consequences of prebankruptcy acts would
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business is worth more alive than dead, saving the going concern also
maximizes recoveries for creditors, including future claimants. Even
if future claims liability were not significant enough to threaten the
viability of the post-reorganization going concern, the continuing
specter of liability might hamper operations. This would depress the
value of the reorganized debtor, and creditors' bankruptcy distributions would be diminished accordingly.
Failure to include future claims would also result in differential
treatment among the debtor's various obligees. In particular, it would
mean differing treatment as between current and future tort victims,
and among future tort victims inter se. 87 All are injured by the identical prebankruptcy conduct of the debtor but would receive differing
treatment based on the serendipity of the timing of their respective
injuries and the vagaries of state law.
The current tort victim receives her ratable share of the common
pool along with other unsecured creditors. The excluded future tort
victim must pursue her nonbankruptcy rights. If the debtor reorganizes internally, then the future tort victim may recover in full. Her
legal rights can not be affected by a proceeding from which she was
excluded. 88 If the debtor instead reorganizes externally--that is, sells
the business-the future claimant is placed in an all-or-nothing position. The debtor will have distributed its assets and disappeared by
the time of the future claimant's injury. If she is lucky, successor liability is available in her state, and she may recover in full from the
acquirer. If unlucky, she receives nothing. 89
jeopardize reorganization); Keating, supra note 58, at 1099 (noting that bankruptcy's solution to
collective action problem preserves going concern value of firm whose survival is threatened by
future claims); Roe, Mass Tort, supranote 2.
87"Fundamental principles of justice require that a person who develops asbestosis 40 years
after exposure should have the same entitlement to compensation as a person who got asbestosis
25 years earlier from the same exposure." NBRC REPORT, supra note 80, at 318; see also Heidt,
Changing Paradigm,supra note 11, at 1084 (describing unequal treatment if future claims are
not included); Smith, supra note 8, at 378-82 (arguing that risk averse tort victims would choose
rule of equal treatment among themselves in Rawlsian hypothetical bargain). But see Roe, Mass
Tort, supra note 2, at 855 (denying applicability of hypothetical bargain rationale to involuntary
tort claimants and asserting that "temporal equality in compensation cannot be unambiguously
derived from fairness principles").
I argue below that in the external reorganization context, future claimants should receive
equal treatment not only with each other and current tort claimants, but with current claimants
generally. See infra Part I(D)(4).
88See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
89 In general, exclusion from bankruptcy's common pool is undesirable from the future
claimant's perspective. If excluded, a future claimant will recover when (1) a going concern is
internally reorganized or (2) the going concern is sold and the future claimant enjoys successor
liability rights against the acquirer. As a practical matter, however, most going concerns will
not survive bankruptcy but will eventually be liquidated piecemeal, which does not produce any
entity to sue. And as to those going concerns sold through external reorganization, successor
products liability is hit-or-miss. See supra Part II(B). Exclusion of future claimants from bank-
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B. MandatoryInclusion Versus Flexibility
A solid conceptual foundation exists, then, for treating future
claims in bankruptcy. Because inclusion of future claims accords
with basic bankruptcy norms, some commentators advocate mandatory inclusion as the only defensible approach. 90 For the most part,
however, they fail to consider the transaction costs that such a rule
may generate, or the effect of such costs on reorganization.9 1 Its implementation may be problematic in many cases. As Professor Davis

ruptcy may therefore leave them with no recovery whatsoever. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE
ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 90-91 (rev. ed. 1993) (describing future claimant's different prospects depending on whether debtor is liquidating or reorganizing); Jackson, Translating Assets
and Liabilities,supra note 80, at 95-96 (stating that unascertained tort claimants may be better
off without successor liability in bankruptcy if as a consequence of its application, such tort
claimants would be left out of the process, while other creditors controlling asset disposition
push for piecemeal liquidation, leaving unascertained claimants with nothing).
90 To be sure, theorists emphasize different aspects of bankruptcy's multifarious goals in
their analyses. Some emphasize the fundamental separation of the debtor's past from its future.
See Jackson, TranslatingAssets and Liabilities,supra note 80, at 82 (stating that future claims
based on debtor's past acts that are cognizable under state law and have some value at time of
bankruptcy should be treated as prebankruptcy claims).
If the debtor were to cease doing business on the filing of the bankruptcy petition, it
would not influence the likelihood that [asbestos] claimants would eventually exhibit
the signs of an asbestos-related disease attributable to the debtor's product. The
company's future survival is irrelevant to whether or not the disease or injury manifests itself.
Id.
Others focus as well on the related purpose of debtor rehabilitation. They reason-either
implicitly or explicitly-that because future claims must be included in some cases in order to
assure a successful reorganization, then for consistency's sake, they should count as prebankruptcy "claims" to be dealt with in all cases. See Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 5, at
145-46 (using going concern sale example to show that survival of business may depend on
treating future claims in bankruptcy); Heidt, Changing Paradigm,supra note 11, at 1084 (asserting that comprehensive inclusion is required to assure successful reorganization); Keating,
supra note 58, at 1098-99 (arguing that only conduct test-which holds that a bankruptcy claim
exists if the debtor's prebankruptcy conduct will ultimately give rise to the claim-works in
solving state law collective action problem, and that inclusion should not depend on the projected magnitude of future claims liability); Roe, Mass Tort, supra note 2 (arguing for inclusion
of future claims in mass tort context but refraining from prescribing any distributional norm).
Still others emphasize an equal treatment rationale. See supra note 87 and accompanying
text. While Professor Smith focuses on the mass tort context, his equal treatment analysis implies that future claims should be included in other bankruptcy contexts as well and receive
equal treatment with current tort victims. See Smith, supra note 8, at 401-09. The NBRC proposal explicitly adopts an equal treatment rationale as a basis for including future claims. See
NBRC REPORT, supra note 80 at 318 (discussing equal treatment with current tort claims); id. at
321 (discussing equal treatment with current claims in liquidation). Ironically, at the same time,
the proposal limits its equal treatment prescription to the mass liability situation. See id. at 322.
For further discussion of the applicability of the equal treatment norm, see infra Part III(D)(4).
91One exception is Professor Keating, who has identified the due process and estimation
problems with an approach requiring comprehensive inclusion of future claims. He suggests
that the insurance market may be available to ameliorate some of these problems. See Keating,
supra note 58, at 1100-02.
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points out, mandatory inclusion "would place an undue and freg
quently unworkable burden on all reorganizations."
The flexible approach 93 is more pragmatic as it enables consideration of such costs. Proposals for a flexible approach are premised on
the idea that reorganization should afford some mechanism by which
final disposition of future claims may be accomplished, and that resort to such a mechanism requires appropriate treatment for future
claims, 94 but that resort to the mechanism should be at the option of
92

Davis, supra note 78, at 366.

[Ulnless a fund of significant size is created, there is a danger it will eat itself up in
administrative costs before paying out to future claims .... Furthermore, the cost of
appointing a representative and paying that representative to investigate and participate in the valuation of future claims and the design of a fund will be significant. To
impose these costs on every reorganization would make little sense, especially because future claims, while always a possibility, are rarely a significant problem for
most businesses.
Id.; see also NBRC REPORT, supra note 80, at 332 (noting question of cost-efficiency in requiring appointment of future claims representative in every case disposing of mass future
claims).
93Three separate reform proposals adopt this general approach. The National Bankruptcy
Conference proposes that future claims be cognizable in bankruptcy, but that the Chapter 11
plan proponent-typically the debtor-be entitled to decide whether to include future claims.
See NBC FINAL REPORT, supranote 80, at 37-38.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposes to include future claims in the
mass liability context, but specifically declines to address future claims outside that context.
Even in a mass liability situation, future claims are not assured of being included. They qualify
for inclusion as "mass future claims" if "the debtor has been subject to numerous demands for
payment for injuries or damages" arising from liability-creating prepetition conduct, and "is
likely to be subject to substantial future demands for payment on similar grounds." NBRC
REPORT, supra note 80, at 322. However, whether those conditions obtain will presumably be
decided by plan proponents. Moreover, appointment of a future claims representative is required only if (1) the plan attempts to deal with mass future claims or (2) a party in interest
petitions for such an appointment. See id. at 329. This arrangement effectively leaves to other
parties the decision whether unrepresented future claimants should be included. It probably
amounts to a flexible approach in practice.
It might be theoretically possible for future claimants to participate or petition for representation. No future claimant, however, would typically have enough financial incentive to do
so. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. It might be possible that bounty-hunting lawyers
would serve as watchdogs for the interests of future claimants. See Davis, supranote 78, at 37980 (speculating that class action lawyers will protect future claimants). See generally John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669
(1986) (discussing economic incentives of and constraints on "bounty hunter" plaintiffs' attorneys). That practice, however, has yet to develop in the future claims context, and courts' reaction to such a practice is difficult to predict.
Professor Davis's proposal provides even more flexibility than the preceding two. Not only
may future claims be ignored in reorganization, but even after the decision is made to include
them and a future claims representative appointed, his proposal allows future claims to be cut
out of any bankruptcy distribution as a form of cramdown. See Davis, supranote 78, at 363.
94 What counts as "appropriate" varies depending on the proposal. All three proposals
contemplate appointment of a representative for future claims. See, e.g., NBC FINAL REPORT,
supra note 80, at 37-39. Only the NBRC proposal embraces equal treatment for future claims
with current claims. See supra note 90. As noted earlier, while Professor Davis's proposal
requires appointment of a future claims representative, if it were decided later in the case that
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the plan proponent. Whether to include future claims would presumably be part of any plan negotiation, with the debtor and current
creditors deciding whether the transaction costs were "worth it." Presumably, they would decide to include future claims only if that were
necessary to save the going concern. 95
Not surprisingly, the National Bankruptcy Conference and the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission-whose numbers include
not only academics but also prominent judges and practitioners, who
must deal with the real world consequences of future claims in bankruptcy-favor flexibility in handling future claims.9 6 It should also
not surprise that the courts have been less than uniform in their treatment of and analyses concerning future claims.
C. CurrentPractice:Costs Versus ConceptualClarity
The question of treating future claims in bankruptcy first became
an issue with the mass tort bankruptciesY9 These cases provided the
original context in which lawyers, courts and theorists worked out the
theory and practice concerning future claims in bankruptcy. From
these cases has emerged a now "traditional" model for addressing
future claims. This section first describes the basic concept and
structure of this traditional approach and the mass tort setting in
which it developed.
The model solution is not costless, however. A large case can
support it. But courts in other cases, with only this ready model from
which to work, have struggled in attempting to reconcile conceptual
future claims should be ignored after all, his proposal would allow their exclusion. See supra
note 93.
95 See Davis, supra note 78, at 361 ("Businesses differ. Sometimes the reorganization will
best be facilitated by bringing future claims into the plan, and sometimes the reverse will be
true."). But see infra Part III(D) (discussing less benign motivations in the external reorganization context).
96 Indeed, the need for flexibility may have been so self-evident within the National Bankruptcy Conference that its report describes this aspect of its proposal in two sentences, with no
express justification or even commentary. See NBC FINAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 37 ("[Ihe
plan proponent (most frequently, the debtor) or the trustee in a chapter 7 case must identify the
liability it wishes to deal with as a future claim.... This permits the proponent, not the potential claimants, to decide initially whether to [include future claims]."). Judge Mabey's article
outlining the original NBC proposal likewise makes no mention of the debtor's discretion built
into the proposal. See Mabey & Zisser, supra note 80, at 503.
97 See NBRC REPORT, supra note 80, at 322 (explaining report's exclusive focus on mass
liability cases because they are "the most pressing and most complex cases, where the claims
...are so massive that they warrant special procedures and protections"); Harvey J. Kesner,
Future Asbestos Related Litigants as Holders of Statutory Claims Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code and Their Place in the Johns-Manville Reorganization (pts. 1 & 2), 62 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 69, 159 (1988) (discussing treatment of future asbestos claims); Roe, Mass Tort,
supra note 2 (describing treatment of mass tort claims in bankruptcy); Smith, supra note 8; see
also Heidt, Changing Paradigm,supra note 11, at 1061-62 (describing "extraordinary liabiities" of mass tort and environmental obligations).
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clarity with scarcity of resources. This section next sketches the
courts' struggle with the different types of cases and the doctrinal
messiness that has emerged.
1. The "Traditional"Approach in the Mass Tort Context
A mass tort case involves a large company that has mass manufactured a product that later proves to be harmful. The company resorts to bankruptcy in order to deal with the ensuing "enterprisethreatening massive liabilities." 98 Such a company finds itself in dire
financial straits, not necessarily because it is short of cash and has
trouble meeting current expenses. Instead, its primary concern is future products liability. The full financial impact of the harmful product may not necessarily have hit the manufacturer's financial statements yet, but past experience makes clear that over time, more and
more victims will sustain injuries and will sue. There is little doubt
that the aggregate liabilities will ultimately be staggering. Ignoring
these future tort liabilities would mean the eventual operational collapse of the manufacturer. 99
The case presents the daunting task of structuring mechanisms to
assure fair and adequate compensation to future tort victims consistent with due process, while at the same time preserving the going
concern value of the tortfeasing company, upon which future claimants may depend for their future compensation. The identities of
many or most future claimants and the extent of their injuries or other
harm may not be known at the time of bankruptcy. t0° The basic

98 NBRC REPORT, supra note 80, at 327.
99 As the cloud of future liability becomes darker and darker, financing would be more and

more difficult to obtain. Doubts about the continuing viability of the business would grow.
Customers and suppliers would defect. Rather than wait for this slow death to overtake the
business, the firm actively seeks a global solution to the overhanging future liabilities. Bankruptcy is an attractive option. See Roe, Mass Tort, supra note 2, at 856-62 (describing slow
process of operational collapse for company beset by mass future tort liabilities that inhibit its
access to capital markets).
The other option that has been tried to date is the settlement class action--that is, a class
action initiated by the defendant, the manufacturer, for the purpose of settling future claims.
The potential for conflicts of interest is of course high, and perhaps fatal. See Amchem Prods. v.
Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997) (affirming denial of certification to proposed settlement class);
Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 2 (discussing problems associated with mass tort class actions);
Coffee, The Corruption of the Class Action, supra note 2, at 853 (arguing that "the critical
problem with settlement class actions is that they permit the defendants to choose the plaintiffs'
attorney").
u) For example, exposure to asbestos may lead to emphysema, mesothelioma, and lung
cancer. However, it would be impossible to identify or locate every person ever exposed to
asbestos, given the popularity of its use as an insulating material from the 1950s to the 1970s.
See Coffee, Class Wars, supranote 2, at 1430 (noting that "virtually every U.S. citizen has been
exposed to asbestos"). In addition, not every person exposed to the substance will manifest ill
effects. The degree of exposure and other environmental factors will matter.
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problem for the debtor manufacturer is to fix or at least cap the aggregate amount of contingent liability, and then to set aside or arrange
for some fixed pool of assets that will be used to pay future claims as

they arise.
A "traditional" model emerged to resolve these issues. It has several novel components. 10 1 To address notice and other due process

problems, the debtor obtains appointment of a special legal representative for future claimants, who typically can not represent themselves. 1°2 Complex estimation proceedings are conducted in order to
value future claims and fix the manufacturer's aggregate liability. 10 3
A claims resolution facility is structured to streamline claims liquidation and disburse payments as future claims mature. 1°4 A trust device
With a product like intrauterine devices (A.H. Robins) or breast implants (Dow Coming),
identification of potential tort claimants may be less problematic. Potential victims of those
products could more readily self-identify in response to widespread publication notice. Some
could conceivably be identified through medical records. The difference is really one of degree.
Even if future claimants could self-identify, though, there remains the problem of getting
healthy future claimants to appreciate the significance of legal proceedings that will only matter
to them in the event of future manifestation of injury. See supranote 10 and accompanying text.
101This model was also followed in at least one case not involving a mass tort situationthat is, where future tort claims were not the primary factor precipitating bankruptcy. In the external reorganization of Piper Aircraft, a legal representative was appointed, future claims were
dealt with in the liquidating plan via a trust fund device, and a channeling injunction was issued
in connection with the plan confirmation. See Piper Disclosure Statement, supra note 12, at 26.
While future claims liability was an important concern in the case, poor management was apparently at least as significant a cause of the company's demise. See iL at 11-12 (describing
"devastating consequences" of key business decisions of prepetition management).
102See, e.g., In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985) (appointing representative
for asbestos-exposed future claimants, who are parties in interest); In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same). Some courts, however, refused to appoint future
claims representatives. See, e.g., Locks v. United States Trustee, 157 B.R. 89 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1993) (discussed infra note 111).
103See, e.g., In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 189 B.R. 681 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (estimating
both prepetition and future asbestos claims for distribution purposes); see also In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1997) (discussing merits of competing estimation
proposals).
While the Code specifically contemplates court estimation of contingent or unliquidated
claims, estimation is specifically authorized only for purposes of allowance, see 11 U.S.C. §
502(c) (1994), and voting, see FED. R. BANKR. P. § 3018(a) (authorizing court to allow claim
temporarily "in an amount which the court deems proper" for voting purposes). Claim allowance determines which claims may validly participate in the case. Only claims that are "allowed" are entitled to vote on the terms of reorganization, see 11 U.S.C. § 1126, and receive
distributions, see i& § 726.
Estimation for purposes of distribution is not specifically authorized in the Code or the
Bankruptcy Rules. Both the National Bankruptcy Conference and the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission have recommended statutory amendments clarifying that courts may estimate claims for purposes of distribution. The NBRC proposal, however, is limited to mass
future claims. See NBC FINAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 39; NBRC REPORT, supra note 80, at
341.
104In Piper,the claim resolution process included mandatory pre-trial mediation, as well as
a binding arbitration alternative to litigation. See Piper Disclosure Statement, supra note 12, at
138-39.
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is employed to manage the assets that will be the source of such pay-

ments. 105 A "channeling injunction" enjoins future claimants from
pursuing the reorganized debtor or any successor to the debtor's business or assets. Future claims are instead channeled to the designated
payment trust, and the going 0concern
is insulated from postbank6
claimants.1
future
by
ruptcy suit

The costs of this traditional approach have run into the tens of
millions of dollars.' °7 However, given the size of the debtors, the

sheer numbers of future claimants and other creditors, and the
staggering amounts of liability, one might expect that comprehen-

The Claims Resolution Facility created by the Robins plan-while not necessarily ideal in
its implementation, see SOBOL, supra note 10, at 309-25 (providing scathing appraisal of
judge's manipulation of supposedly independent claims resolution facility and associated
trust)-provides an interesting framework of procedural choices. It offers several different
claim processing options, ranging from a "short form," which pays the electing claimant a
nominal amount upon a minimal showing of Dalkon Shield use and injury, to a fairly elaborate
settlement process involving in-depth review of the claim, including the electing claimant's
medical records. Should the process fail to produce a settlement, the claimant may resort to
binding arbitration or trial. See Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement Pursuant to
Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re A.H. Robins Co. (Bankr. E.D. Va. March 28, 1998)
(No. 85-01307-R), at CRF 1-9 [hereinafter Robins Disclosure Statement]; see also Mark A.
Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments on Claims Resolution Facilities,LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 113, 113-36 (1990) (comparing differing features and
objectives of several claims resolution facilities).
105
See, e.g., In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Lit. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 982 F.2d
721 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing plight of Manville Trust), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
See generally Roe, Mass Tort, supra note 2, at 864-92 (describing payment devices to manage
uncertainty regarding aggregate claims liability).
106See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988) (enjoining suit against
successor corporation, among others), aff'd sub nom. Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H.
Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 625
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that bankruptcy court has equitable power to issue channeling
injunction), aj'd sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988); Piper
Disclosure Statement, supra note 12, at 112 (describing channeling injunction). Of these three
cases, only Piperinvolved an asset sale. Manville was internally reorganized, and the channeling injunction was used to insulate the reorganized debtor and others from suit by future claimants. See Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. at 624. In A.H. Robins, the debtor was merged into another
entity as part of the plan. That surviving entity and others were the beneficiaries of the channeling injunction. See A.H. Robins, 88 B.R. at 751.
107 See Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig.), 129
B.R. 710,750 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified, 993 F.2d
7 (2d Cir. 1993) (describing costly process of resolving asbestos claims in several cases, and
noting specifically that "[t]he Manville Trust, designed to fairly and expeditiously compensate
personal injury claimants was spending approximately one million dollars a week on outside
counsel litigation defense costs alone in 1990 in addition to its own staff counsel and overhead
costs at a time when it had almost no unrestricted cash"); Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 686 (1989) (describing the claims estimation
process in the A. H. Robins bankruptcy as "the largest and most expensive social science survey
ever conducted under the auspices of a court" and noting that the data collection process alone
cost five million dollars); Trust Officials Report Surge in Claim Filings in 1994, MEALEY'S
LITIGATION REPORT: ASBESTOS, March 17, 1995, at 1 (reporting that for 1994, Manville Trust
operating expenses totaled $8.1 million, and total expenses were approximately $14.7 million).
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Moreover, the large

stakes involved suggest both the far-reaching consequences of op-

erational collapse and that avoiding such consequences may be
worth a significant investment.' °9 Given these stakes, innovative

solutions are possible that might be cost-prohibitive in other circumstances.110
2. Pragmatismwith Future Claims
Future claims in the run-of-the-mill case raise the same con-

ceptual difficulties as in the mass tort context. However, for small
and medium-sized companies, the economics are quite different,
108

But cf. John A. Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REV.

990, 1000-05 (1995) (questioning claims that transaction costs for mass torts are "too high").
109Whether debtor rehabilitation should be a goal of Chapter 11 is the subject of some debate. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 55, at 100 (suggesting that core purpose of bankruptcy
law should be to solve collective action problem among creditors). However, that rehabilitation
currently is a goal can not be gainsaid.
110The legal basis for this overall approach is not free from doubt. See NBC FINAL
REPORT, supra note 80, at 34, and NBRC REPORT, supra note 80, at 315, which describe the
current legal uncertainty relating to this "traditional" model for treating future claims in the
mass liability context, as well as legislative proposals to address this uncertainty. In the/mass
tort asbestos cases, even Congress was solicited to provide specific benediction. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(g) (1994) (authorizing, both retroactively and prospectively, issuance of channeling injunction in asbestos case, provided, interalia,that trust is created to pay future claims).
Actual results to date have also not been without controversy. These schemes have sometimes been subverted in the implementation-largely in the valuing or allowance of future
claims--in order to guarantee survival of the going concern and more than nominal returns to
equity holders, which of course comes at future claimants' expense. See, e.g., In re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 599 & n.56 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) ("The failure of the traditional
model, which was first crafted in Johns-Manville, is widely recognized."); Findley v. Blinken
(In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig.), 129 B.R. 710, 754-62 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993) (describing
problem of massive underfunding of Manville Trust); SOBOL, supra note 10, at 309-25 (describing judge's manipulation of purportedly independent Claimants Trust in order to assure
"accuracy" of court's prior estimate in A.H. Robins bankruptcy); Mabey & Zisser, supra note
80, at 495-96 (explaining favoritism of current claims over future claims in structuring of Manville Trust).
Nevertheless, there may be some basis for optimism concerning the traditional model. As
Professors Warren and Westbrook aptly note:
[Gliven the novel use of bankruptcy laws to address a massive social problem that
Congress and other institutions refused to address, it could be argued-as Dr. Johnson said of the dog walking on its hind legs-that the wonder was not that it was
done badly, but that it was done at all.
WARREN & WESTROOK, supra note 57, at 799. Given the value at stake in the large cases, the
consequent public scrutiny of their outcomes and the attention of reform proponents aimed at
mass future liability issues, we may be hopeful that legal clarity will evolve and that implementation of the model will improve. For examples of innovative approaches, see Smith, supra note
8 (describing use of capital markets as solution to problems of estimation and distribution with
respect to future claims); Dow Coming, 211 B.R. at 601-03 (describing Professor Smith's capital markets approach and urging its consideration by the parties); and Michael J. Saks & Peter
David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in
the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992) (arguing that aggregation and sampling
produces more precise and reliable outcomes than individualized bilateral trials).
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and future tort liabilities may not necessarily be the central issue in
bankruptcy. In this context, administration of future claims may
be prohibitively expensive. Even if there is going concern value
and it is successfully salvaged, resort to the traditional model
would likely generate significant fixed costs disproportionate to
the size of the case or any expected benefit to future claimants."'
On the other hand, no alternative approach seems to have developed. Given the smaller stakes and fewer resources involved,
and the possibly incidental nature of the future claims liability, ignoring future claims may be a tempting alternative to dealing with
them. The immediate pressures to rehabilitate the business, save
jobs, and preserve firm-specific capital like customer and supplier
relationships, 12 all conspire to overwhelm any attempt at fair and
equitable treatment of faceless, nameless future tort3 victims. As
previously discussed, this often happens in practice.1
a. "Creditors" and "Claims": The Statutory Issue

Courts have wrestled over the fundamental question whether or
not future claimants qualify as "creditors" that can be dealt with in
bankruptcy. Consistent with the notion of separating the debtor's
past from its future, only if their claims "arise" before bankruptcy
may future claimants be considered creditors.1 14 And a close

1'Even for a large debtor, which may be able to bear significant administrative expenses,
whether a viable going concern can be salvaged may not be clear at the outset of the case. If
piecemeal liquidation turns out to be the result-and any optimism concerning any going concern value turns out to have been unfounded-then an inordinate amount of scant liquidation
proceeds may be consumed by the administrative costs of including future claims, leaving only
a relatively small residue for actual distribution to current and future claimants. For example, in
Locks v. United States Trustee, 157 B.R. 89 (W.D. Pa. 1993), the court refused to appoint a legal
representative for future claims because the debtor was liquidating. Since there would be no
business left to save from overhanging future claims liability, the court was unwilling to recognize future claimants as creditors, citing among other reasons the administrative costs of maintaining a facility to pay future claims and the minimal dividend they would receive. Future
claims received no consideration. See id. at 99. But see In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58
B.R. 476 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1986), in which the court appointed a future claims representative
even though the debtor was liquidating. "[I]t would be highly inequitable to distribute the liquidated assets of the debtor to the currently known plaintiffs to the detriment of the potential
claimants merely because the potential claimants have not yet manifested an injury." Id. at 477.
112See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance
of
ContractualRelations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 238-45 (1979) (describing transaction-specific
investment in contractual relations).
113See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
14 A creditor is an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief ..
"11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (1994), which for a voluntary petition
occurs upon the filing of the petition. See id. § 301. The legislative history makes clear that
"'[c]reditor' is defined to include only holders of prepetition claims against the debtor." H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
Section 101(5) defines "claim" as a
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reading of the Bankruptcy Code" 5 suggests that only creditors are
eligible to participate in bankruptcy and share in bankruptcy distributions." 6 If future claims are deemed not to arise prebankruptcy,
then bankruptcy would seem ineffective to address or affect future
claimants' rights.
This question is a tricky one." 7 The definition of "claim" includes contingent and unmatured rights to payment, 118 and legislative
history suggests that Congress intended to be quite inclusive in defining the types of obligations that could be included. 9 However,
courts disagree as to the proper construction of these critical terms.
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives
rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy
is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
ll U.S.C. § 101(5).
1..11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994). The Bankruptcy Code may be referred to herein as the
"Code." Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent statutory references are to the Bankruptcy
Code.
116A proof of claim may be filed only by or on behalf of a creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 501.
The allowance of the claim will be determined as of the petition date. See id. § 502. Only such
allowed claims may share in the bankruptcy distribution and vote on the Chapter 11 plan. See id.
§§ 726, 1126. The terms of a Chapter 11 plan bind "any creditor," and confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan discharges only preconfirmation debts. See id. § 1141(a), (d)(1)(A).
In addition, only prepetition claims are subject to the automatic stay. The filing of a bankruptcy
petition stays collection efforts only as to claims which "arose before the commencement of the
case." Id. § 362(a)(1).
117 A related issue involves the interim claim, which first becomes apparent during the
course of the case. For example, the tort victim using the debtor's defective product manufactured prepetition, who sustains injury after the petition has been filed but before confirmation,
has been identified in time to assert a claim in the case. Courts have struggled over the question
whether this is a prepetition claim or not, as the automatic stay applies only to a claim which
"arose before commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). Compare Grady v. A.H.
Robins Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that even though
injury from Dalkon Shield arose postpetition, Plaintiffs held prepetition claim subject to stay
where tortious acts giving rise to liability were performed prepetition), with Pettibone Corp. v.
Ramirez (In re Pettibone Corp.), 90 B.R. 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that although
allegedly defective product was manufactured prepetition, no prepetition relationship existed;
therefore, Plaintiff held postpetition claim not subject to stay, though court might consider issuing an injunction staying Plaintiff's suit in reliance on section 105(a)).
As a practical matter, this type of claim should not trouble us much. It does not raise the
serious problems of the sort implicated by "true" future claims, i.e., those for which the identity
of the claimant or the fact of injury can not be determined until after the bankruptcy has concluded. However, as the cases cited in the preceding paragraph suggest, cases involving interim
claims often result in rulings that affect treatment of future claims as well. See also Davis, supra
note 78, at 337 (coining the phrase "interim claim").
118See supranote 114.
19 "By this broadest possible definition ....
the bill contemplates that all legal obligations
of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court." HOUSE REPORT,
supranote 114, at 309.
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Several different approaches have been discussed for determining
when future claims arise.120 Of these, the conduct test is probably the
most conceptually appealing. Under this test, if the debtor's conduct
giving rise to the eventual liability has already occurred by the time
the petition is filed, then claims for the future injuries resulting
from
21
claims.
pre-bankruptcy
deemed
are
conduct
that pre-petition
The conduct test is most appealing simply because it effects the
separation of the debtor's past from its future and enables comprehensive relief from the debtor's past blunders.122 And only a conduct test
12 See Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58
F.3d 1573 (1lth Cir. 1995) (discussing state law accrual test, conduct test and Piper test),
modifying 162 B.R. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994); see also Gregory A. Bibler, The Status of
Unaccrued Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 61 AM. BANKR. LJ. 145
(1987) (arguing for accrued state law claim test); Roe, Mass Tort, supra note 2, at 893-98 (discussing statutory basis for including future claims in reorganization and arguing for such inclusion).
Courts sometimes describe the issue as one of determining whether particular rights qualify
as "claims," but a close reading of the statutory definitions suggests that the issue is one of
timing-that is, when does a particular claim arise? See Heidt, Changing Paradigm,supra note
11, at 1059 n.10.
121See Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc. (In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc.), 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.
1988) (holding that even though injury from Dalkon shield arose postpetition, Plaintiffs held
prepetition claim subject to stay where tortious acts giving rise to liability were performed prepetition); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Aguiar (In re Waterman S.S. Corp.), 141 B.R. 552 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992) (adopting conduct test in asbestos case), vacated on other grounds, 157 B.R.
220 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
In addition to the conduct test, other plausible tests have been discussed. The accrued state
law claim test is the narrowest. Under this test, a claim is deemed to arise only when a cause of
action accrues under state law. See In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); Schwinn Cycling & Fitness, Inc. v. Benonis (In re Schwinn
Bicycle Co.), 210 B.R. 747 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997), affd, 217 B.R. 790 (N.D. Il. 1997). In the
product liability context, this would mean that no bankruptcy claim arises until some cognizable
harm has occurred. Therefore, future claims would not be included. This narrow approach has
been "roundly criticized." Jensen v. California Dep't of Health Servs. (In re Jensen), 127 B.R.
27, 30 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), affid, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Transportation Sys. Int'l
Inc., 110 B.R. 888, 894 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990), aff'd sub nom. Lovett v. Honeywell, Inc., 930
F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1991).
The conduct test is the broadest test. Tests of intermediate breadth have also developed.
The Pipertest requires not only prepetition conduct but also the existence of some preconfirmation relationship between the debtor and the tort victim. See Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that only
those parties asserting claims based on the debtor's prepetition conduct and having preconfirmation relation with the debtor are deemed to hold bankruptcy claims), modifying 162 B.R. 619
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994). The fair contemplation test requires that the claim be within the "fair
contemplation" of the parties at the time of bankruptcy. See California Dep't of Health Servs. v.
Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1993).
122See Heidt, Changing Paradigm,supra note 11, at 1084-85 (asserting that only conduct
test effects appropriate separation of debtor's past and future); Jackson, TranslatingAssets and
Liabilities,supra note 80, at 82-83 (stating that future claims based on the debtor's past acts that
are cognizable under state law and have some value at time of bankruptcy should be treated as
prebankruptcy claims); Keating, supra note 58, at 1098-99 (arguing that only conduct test works
in solving state law collective action problem); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
This test should require relatively specific identification of the particular harm- or obligationcreating conduct that is meant to be addressed. This requirement prevents open-ended discharge
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enables all those affected by the debtor's past blunders to receive
equal treatment. 12 A less inclusive test might not suffice.
This conceptual appeal, however, belies the difficult practical consequences that may result. The conduct test effectively requires a
mandatory approach. If prepetition liability-creating conduct is sufficient to confer prebankruptcy "claim" status, then future claims must
be dealt with in all bankruptcy cases, regardless of the size of a given
case, the reason for the filing, or whether the debtor ultimately reorganizes internally or externally, or liquidates piecemeal. 124 This
seems fair conceptually, but as previously discussed, the transaction
costs generated may be prohibitive.
b. JudicialPragmatism
Perhaps reflecting the disharmony between conceptual clarity and

practical messiness, the courts have handled this issue in resultoriented fashion more or less-that is, include future claims if necessary to save the business, 125 exclude them if not, 126 and hedge if unclear. In Amatex,12 7 for example, the court hedged. It proclaimed that
whether or not future claims are deemed to arise prebankruptcy, future claimants are at least "parties in interest," if not creditors. Thereof obligations and

avoids concomitant due process problem. See NBC FINAL REPORT, supra
note 80, at 37.
123 See supranotes 87-89 and accompanying text.
124The Code currently provides no flexibility in this regard. Reform proposals adopt variants of the conduct test. See NBC FINAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 35-37 (proposing conductbased test); NBRC REPORT, supra note 80, at 326 (espousing conduct-based test); Davis, supra
note 78, at 361-64 (espousing preconfirmation conduct test). These proposals, however, also
include provisions that would allow future claims to be excluded despite their status as prebankruptcy claims. See supra note 93.
125See Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc. (In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc.), 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.
1988); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Aguiar (In re Waterman S.S. Corp.), 141 B.R. 552 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 157 B.R. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). See also In re UNR
Ind., Inc., 725 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, 1.), in which the court questioned the
correctness of district judge's view that future asbestosis claimants have no rights in bankruptcy.
The appeals court suggested that even if future claims may not qualify as statutory prebankruptcy claims, the lower court's equitable powers "just might be broad enough to enable the
court to make provision for" such future claims in the plan of reorganization. Id. at 1119. See
generally Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690,701-05 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (adopting
conduct test as basis for holding, in dentist's Chapter 7 case, that automatic stay applied to patient's injury discovered postpetition but caused by debtor-dentist's prepetition negligence).
16See, e.g., In re Piper, 162 B.R. 619, 628 (Bankr. S.D. Fla 1994) (rejecting conduct test in
part because of debtor's view that the going concern sale could be effected without inclusion of
future claims); Locks v. United States Trustee, 157 B.R. 89 (W.D. Pa. 1993); discussion supra
note 111. But see Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R.
910 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) (finding, in airplane manufacturer's bankruptcy, that failure to
afford notice and due process to future claimants-or any consideration at all in bankruptcy
proceeding-requires finding that their claims are not bankruptcy claims and their successor
liability rights survive), vacated, 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998).
127In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985).
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fore, appointment of a legal representative in Chapter 11 was justified.'2'
In Piper,12 9 the future claims issue was a moving target. Initially,
at the behest of a prospective acquirer, the debtor sought appointment
of a future claims representative.1 30 It seemed unlikely that a buyer
could be found unless future products liabilities of the extant fleet
were addressed in the bankruptcy and successor liability risks eliminated, and formal representation of future claimants was thought necessary to bind future claimants to any plan. 13 1 In the order appointing
Professor David Epstein as the future claims representative, the court
was willing to define a class of future claimants based on the conduct
test. 132 However, the court expressly refused at that point to decide
whether that class held prebankruptcy claims under the Code. 133
Professor Epstein later filed a proof of claim for $100,000,000 on
behalf of his broad class of future claimants, the estimate of future
liability having been gleaned from a study prepared by the debtor's
actuary. 134 The debtor, the Committee and several prospective acquirers objected, however. 35 By that point, the debtor and Committee believed that a buyer could be found even without addressing future claims. 136 The court disallowed the proof of claim, holding that
not all future claims qualified as prebankruptcy claims. Unwilling to
countenance the notion that unidentifiable future tort victims could or
should be included in the bankruptcy proceeding, the court rejected
128 See id. at 1041; see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984) (same analysis).
129Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d

1563 (11th Cir. 1995), affg 168 B.R. 434 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), aff'g sub nom. In re Piper
Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
13oThe prospective purchaser, Pilatus Aircraft Limited, had signed a letter of intent with the
debtor. The letter of intent included a requirement that the debtor seek appointment of a future
claims representative so that future claims could be paid off and disposed of. See Piper, 162
B.R. at 621.
131 See id. at 622 n.3.
132 The class of Future Claimants was defined to include:
All persons, whether known or unknown, born or unborn, who may, after the date of
confirmation of Piper's Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, assert a claim or claims
for personal injury, property damages, wrongful death, damages, contribution and/or
indemnification, based in whole or in part upon events occurring or arising after the
Confirmation Date, including claims based on the law of product liability, against
Piper or its successor arising out of or relating to aircraft or parts manufactured and
sold, designed, distributed or supported by Piper prior to the Confirmation Date.
Epstein,58 F.3d at 1575-76.
113See id. at 1575.
134See Letter from David Epstein, Professor, The University of Alabama School of Law, to
Frederick Tung, Associate Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law (Apr. 1, 1998)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Epstein Correspondence].
135See Piper, 162 B.R. at 622. Pilatus, the prospective acquirer that had requested appointment
of a future claims representative, sided with Professor Epstein. See id. at 623.
6
11 See id. at 622 n.3.
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Professor Epstein's proposed conduct test, finding its scope over-

broad. 137
Instead, the court adopted a preconfirmation relationship test.
That the liability at issue was based on the debtor's prepetition conduct was not sufficient to create a prebankruptcy claim. In addition,
the existence of a preconfirmation relationship between the debtor
and claimant139was required. 138 Professor Epstein's proposed class did

not qualify.

The conclusion to the case provides a further irony. The liquidating plan that was ultimately confirmed with Professor Epstein's support adopted his broad definition of future claims-implicitly adopting a conduct test-and provided for future claims on a par with cur-

rent claims. 14° Professor Epstein's original approach was thus vindicated.
This outcome, however, was not so much a triumph of principle as

one of politics. Critical to the consensual resolution of the case 141 was
the enactment by Congress of the General Aviation Revitalization Act
of 1994.142 This statute of repose prohibits products liability suits
against manufacturers of general aviation aircraft for accidents involving aircraft more than eighteen years old.1 43 The effect of this
statute on the Piper bankruptcy was to reduce significantly the
debtor's aggregate future claims liability, thereby leaving enough
value to satisfy all parties. The law became effective at an opportune
moment in the case-while the bankruptcy court's decision disal-

'

37

See id. at 628-29.

' See Epstein, 58 F.3d at 1577. Such a relationship could be based, for example, on contact, exposure, impact or privity. See id. The bankruptcy court had originally required a prepetition relationship but modified this position in Piperv. Calabro (In re PiperAircraft Corp.),
169 B.R. 766 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), and the court of appeals affirmed the test as modified.
See Epstein, 58 F.3d at 1577-78 & n.5.
139See id at 1577. Of course, some subset of Professor Epstein's proposed class would
have qualified under the court's test. But the class itself, structured as it was around the conduct
test, was
defined too broadly for the court's liking.
40
' See Piper Disclosure Statement, supranote 12, at 53.
141See Epstein Correspondence, supranote 134.
142Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat 1552, (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1994)).
143See id. §§ 2(a), 3. Our hypothetical future claimant, see suprapp. 436-37, would not be

affected, since she was not aboard the plane that caused her harm. See id. § 2(b)(3). The definition of "general aviation aircraff' is limited to aircraft that carry fewer than twenty people and
were not engaged in passenger carrying operations at the time of the accident. See id. § 2(c).
Component manufacturers are also covered. See id. § 2(a). Repose is not available where (1)
the manufacturer knowingly misrepresents or conceals safety information from the Federal
Aviation Administration; (2) the claimant was a passenger for purposes of receiving medical or
emergency treatment; (3) the claimant was not aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident; or
(4) the claimant's cause of action is based on the manufacturer's written warranties. See id. §
2(b)(I)-(4).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 49.435

lowing Professor Epstein's claim was making its way on appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit.144
D. A FlexibleApproach

Given the differing consequences of including future claims in
the different types of cases, a flexible approach has superficial ap-

peal. If bankruptcy's goal is to rehabilitate troubled companies,
why not simply allow for inclusion or exclusion of future claims
depending on the particular needs of the case? After all, if future

claimants are not included, then their formal legal rights are not
affected. Their rights outside of bankruptcy are preserved, so they

are not harmed by their exclusion from the proceeding.
1. The Flexible Approach in External Reorganization

The flexible approach may do no harm in internal reorganization, but with respect to external reorganization, the above depiction ignores the liability avoidance that a flexible approach permits.

Flexibility to exclude future claims may be acceptable in internal reorganization, because the reorganized debtor survives to answer for claims-future or otherwise-that were not included.

45

While such omitted claims, if valid, will collect 100-cent dollars
from the reorganized debtor, the impact on other creditors and
their collective settlement may be negligible, or at least acceptable. 146 In that situation, omitting future claims may make sense.
The result in external reorganization, however, is quite different. As with the asset sale outside of bankruptcy, future claimants

excluded from external reorganization may have no recourse
against the going concern that survives. The debtor sells the business to a third party, sale proceeds are distributed and only the

empty corporate shell remains. As in the nonbankruptcy context,
144See

Telephone Interview with David Epstein, Professor, The University of Alabama

School of Law (Apr. 8, 1998).
145Claimants' right to due process under the Fifth Amendment precludes their discharge
based on a bankruptcy proceeding of which they received no notice and were otherwise excluded. See Dalton Dev. Project #1 v. Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Unioil), 948 F.2d 678
(10th Cir. 1991); Reliable Electric Co. v. Olson Construction Co., 726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir.
1984).
146The transaction cost savings from not including future claims may more than make up
for the costs to the reorganized debtor-and the indirect cost to current creditors in terms of the
reduced value available for distribution-of having to pay future claims in full as they mature
postbankruptcy. The aggregate amount of future claims liability, especially when discounted to
present value, may not be worth the fuss of attempting to account for it in reorganization. In
many, if not most cases, survival of the business will not depend on treating future claims.
Aside from the transaction cost savings then, excluding future claims is essentially a distributional issue to which the nominally disadvantaged parties-current creditors-may consent.
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future claimants' rights against the bankruptcy acquirer will depend on state law successor liability rules.
Given that the firm's creditors-both current creditors and future claimants-are the firm's residual owners, it is largely current
creditors' interests that are at stake in the issue of whether future
claims are included in bankruptcy. Furthermore, inclusion of future claims is decided by the debtor's management, current creditors and the prospective acquirer, without input or participation by
unrepresented future claimants.1 47 Much like the shareholders of

the target firm outside of bankruptcy, 148 current creditors, as the
debtor's residual claimants, will attempt to structure a deal with
the acquirer that maximizes their returns. This may not always
coincide with the maximizing of sale proceeds or returns to creditors overall, or even with the preservation of the going concern.
Current creditors will push for inclusion of future claims only
when it is to their benefit. 49 While the nominal justification for
flexibility is the transaction cost savings from excluding future
claims, excluding them also enables liability avoidance. Simply
put, current creditors may improve their own recoveries by cutting
future claims out of the bankruptcy distribution.
Initially, I consider current creditors' calculus-and the likelihood of future claimants' inclusion-absent transaction costs. 150
This approach isolates current creditors' liability avoidance incentives. I later reintroduce transaction costs and draw some general
conclusions as to their effect on current creditors' strategies and
future claimants' prospects.' 5'
2. CurrentCreditors' Calculus
Once the decision has been made to sell the assets, the debtor and
current creditors have three basic options for disposition: (i) a "clean"
going concern sale, which includes future claims in the bankruptcy
147Absent

appointment of a legal representative, future claimants are not represented. But

see In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1040-41 (3d Cir. 1985) (professed future claimant appeared seeking to intervene in opposition to appointment of legal representative). But appointment of a representative does not occur spontaneously. It occurs at the behest of a party that is
represented in the bankruptcy. This suggests that no representative will be appointed for future
claimants
unless some other party stands to benefit.
48
1 See supraPart 1(A).
149Current creditors will not be able to dictate the form of the asset disposition. That decision is nominally the debtor's, although the court will certainly hear creditors' views in the
process of approving the sale. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. Once the decision
is made to sell the assets, the debtor's management has no strong stake in the outcome. Absent
side payments from an acquirer-e.g., the promise of a post-sale consulting contract-management has basically thrown in the towel by that point.
1501 also assume no secured debt and no general administrative expenses. These latter assumptions
are purely for ease of exposition and do not affect the analysis.
51
1 See infra Part IIe(D)(3).
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distribution; (ii) a "quick and dirty" going concern sale, which excludes future claims and leaves the acquirer susceptible to postbankruptcy successor liability claims; and (iii) a piecemeal liquidation,
which typically excludes future claims. When will current creditors
push for the first option, such that future claims will be included?
a. Asset DispositionAlternatives
The acquirer will naturally pay a higher price for an enterprise free
of the threat of successor liability than otherwise. With the clean sale,
it will pay "full price" for "clean" assets, on the condition that future
claims be provided for in the bankruptcy. 152 While current creditors
will have to share sale proceeds with future claimants, the former
stand to benefit insofar as their distributions improve because of the
acquirer's willingness to pay full price. Recoveries for both current
creditors and future claimants will equal their pro rata shares of the
debtor's going concern value. 153 Put differently, as a group, current
value less future claimcreditors recover the debtor's going concern
14
value.
that
of
share
rata
pro
ants' aggregate
Instead of the above scenario, current creditors might prefer a different deal. They might opt for a "quick and dirty" going concern
152This

would, under my prescription, entitle the acquirer to an injunction against postbank-

ruptcy successor liability claims. While the current state of the law offers no guarantees in this
regard, the chances of successfully eliminating successor liability claims are much better if
future claims are accounted for in the bankrupicy proceeding. See infra Part IV(A).
153For the clean going concern sale, we can represent each creditor's return as follows.
If we let:
1. LV equal the piecemeal liquidation value of the assets-that is, the scrap
value;
2. GW equal the goodwill of the business-that is, the incremental value of the
going concern over and above the scrap value;
3. CC equal the aggregate amount of allowed current claims; and
4. FC equal the estimated aggregate amount of allowed future claims liability,
discounted to present value;
then, in a pro rata distribution among current and future claims, the payout ratio for each current
and future claim (which we will refer to as R) is roughly
Rc=

LV-+ GW
CC + FC

Each current and future claimant receives a bankruptcy distribution equal the amount of its
allowed claim multiplied by the above fraction. Note that R. is simply the going concern value
of the business, divided by the aggregate dollar amount of current and future claims.
Assume, for example, the following values for a hypothetical debtor: LV=5; GW=7;
CC=14; FC=10. In a clean sale of the debtor's business, proceeds of 12 would be shared among
24 in current and future claims. Rc would therefore equal 0.5. Each claim therefore receives
fifty cents on the dollar.
154 Current creditors as a group stand to receive aggregate distributions (which we refer to
as D) equaling
D, = LV+ GW- (FC)(R).
Continuing with our hypothetical, current creditors as a group would stand to receive D, of 5+7(10)(.5) or 7.
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sale, without including future claims in the proceeding. 155 The acquirer runs the risk of being tagged in the future with successor liability under state law,15 6 and will discount its purchase price accordingly.15 7 Depending on the size of the discount, current creditors
might decide they are better off sharing a smaller pie among them158
selves than having to include future claimants in the distribution.
When will this occur? 159 The acquirer would be willing to payand the distribution to current creditors in a quick and dirty sale
would therefore equal-the going concern value of the business less
some discount for successor liability. The lower the acquirer's
perceived successor liability risk, the lower the discount and the
greater the bankruptcy distribution to current creditors. In effect, the
successor liability discount represents the amount of going concern
value current creditors must forsake-indirectly-to future claimants
as a group. When this amount is less than the amount current
creditors would give up to future claimants in a pro rata distribution
under a clean sale-that is, future claimants' aggregate pro rata share
of the debtor's going concern value--current creditors as a group do
better with a quick and dirty sale. 16 The less likely the threat of

15'Some type of free-and-clear sale order will be requested in any event, with bankruptcy
courts generally willing to oblige. See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
156 Bankruptcy will not likely-nor should it-be effective to preclude future claimants'
successor liability rights if the proceeding fails to include them. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
'57See supra Part II(C). In a world of no transaction costs and perfect information, the acquirer would be indifferent as between paying full price for clean assets and a discounted price
in the quick and dirty sale. In the real world, however, the acquirer will compare (I) the discount that current creditors would be willing to accept in return for not having to share with
future claimants, with (2) the likely costs of having to pay future successor liability claims over
time, discounted to present value. The acquirer might decide that bearing the risk of successor
liability is cheaper than the immediate costs of including future claims in bankruptcy. Given the
patchwork of state laws on successor products liability, which provide only porous protection
for future claimants and only uncertain liability for any acquirer, an acquirer might decide to run
the risk of future litigation, rather than pay a premium for a bankruptcy court injunction whose
enforceaibility is in doubt.
158The aggregate distribution to current creditors (which we will refer to as Dqd) from the
quick and dirty sale can be represented as:
Dqd = LV+ GW -(FC)(Pa)
where:
1. P, is the aggregate probability of imposition of successor liability. Given
the uneven prospects for successor liability following the sale, this probability may in many cases be small.
2.

(FC)(Pa) therefore represents both the acquirer's estimate of the ultimate
cost to it of successor liability and also (roughly) the discount by which it
will reduce its bid price for the business.
Dqj, then, represents the going concern value of the business less the acquirer's successor liability discount.
19 That is, when will Dqd > Dc?
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with a quick and dirty sale.160 The less likely the threat of successor
liability,
the better the quick and dirty sale looks for current credi1
tors.

16

A third scenario is also possible. Current creditors may decide
that they can maximize their bankruptcy distributions by forcing the
debtor's piecemeal liquidation while excluding future claims. 162 In
160

This will turn largely on P,1.
Comparing the two formulae above for Dqd and D, shows

that current creditors will opt for a quick and dirty sale when P,,< R, that is, when the aggregate
probability of successor liability is less than the payout ratio from a clean sale. For example, if
all unsecured creditors would receive a 50% payout if future claims were included, current
creditors would exclude future claims when the aggregate probability of successor liability is
less than 50%.
To further refine our intuitions, consider the case where applicable state law did not recognize successor liability-and therefore P,1 equals zero. There, current creditors would prefer the
quick and dirty sale. Regardless of the amount of future claims liability, the sale would be
effective to wipe out that liability. The acquirer would be willing to pay full price for the business, with no successor liability discount. Current creditors would enjoy the entire going concern value without having to share with future claims. In this situation, neither current creditors
nor any other represented party has any incentive to include future claims. This is of course the
same outcome as outside of bankruptcy under a regime without successor liability.
More formally, current creditors would take LV+ GW, which is greater than their alternative going concern distribution of LV+ GW- (FC)(R).
By contrast, if successor liability were universal-and P,1 were therefore equal to 1-then
current creditors would prefer to include future claims. Assuming going concern value is insufficient to pay all claims in full, current creditors would do better sharing with future claims the
full price sale consideration that results from a clean sale, rather than keeping the entirety of the
heavily discounted sale consideration that would result from a quick and dirty sale. In this latter
case, the acquirer would attempt to take a successor liability discount equal to the full amount of
future claims liability, since that would be the amount of future liability the acquirer could expect to face. Future claims would ultimately be paid in full from the acquirer pursuant to their
successor liability rights. Current creditors would therefore take only the difference between
going concern value and future claims liability. In the zero-sum game of distributing the going
concern value among current and future claims, current creditors would rather include future
claims, forcing them to share the pain of asset insufficiency. Excluding future claims, by contrast, would effectively grant them priority status.
More precisely, in this quick and dirty sale with P,, = 1, current creditors as a group would
take LV+GW-FC, which is less than their distribution from the clean sale, LV+GW-(FC)(R),
assuming the debtor is insolvent. That is, the debtor's going concern value is insufficient to pay
all current and future claims in full, and therefore Rc < 1.
161Assume for our hypothetical debtor, see supranotesl53-54, that P, = 0.2. The acquirer
will take a successor liability discount equal to 5, and current creditors enjoy Dqd of 5+7-2 or 10.
Because PI< Rc, the successor liability discount (equal to 2) is less than future claimants' share
of clean sale distributions (equal to 5). Therefore Dqd > Dc, and current creditors will prefer the
quick and dirty sale.
162 See, for example, In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1036 (3d Cir. 1985), where
the
Creditors' Committee opposed the debtor's reorganization plan, which included participation by
future claimants and appointment of a future claims representative. Instead, the Committee
pushed for piecemeal liquidation and exclusion of future claims, arguing that future claimants
are not "creditors" under the Code and therefore have no rights in bankruptcy. See id. at 1043.
Future claims are typically, though not always, excluded in a piecemeal liquidation because of
the perceived transaction costs of including them. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
However, future claimants should be included and receive equal treatment in piecemeal liquidation, both to vindicate bankruptcy's equal treatment norm and to eliminate current creditors'
strategic incentive to dismantle an otherwise viable going concern. See infra note 182.
Current creditors may also have to contend with managerial reluctance to dismember the
business. "Dissolution ... offends managers' sense of professionalism, since managers view
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the piecemeal liquidation, current creditors' aggregate distribution
would equal the scrap value of the debtor's assets. 163 Ifthis scrap
value is greater, relative to the aggregate amount of current claims,
than the goodwill of the business, relative to the aggregate amount of
future claims liability, then current creditors do better taking just the
scrap value, rather than having to share the entire going concern value
with a relatively large class of future claims.164
Current creditors may also prefer piecemeal liquidation to a quick
and dirty going concern sale, since the latter runs the successor liability risk. 165 Specifically, current creditors will prefer piecemeal liquidation when the successor liability discount is greater than the goodwill of the business. In that case, liquidation proceeds simply exceed
166 making
the proceeds from the quick and dirty going concern sale,
167
creditors.
current
liquidation a more attractive option for
b. Future Claimants' Predicament
Now, where does this leave future claimants? If their inclusion

in external reorganization is optional, they would share in a bankruptcy distribution-that is, when current creditors and the acquirer would agree to a clean going concern sale-only if two
conditions are met. 6 8 First, there must be some relatively signifitheir job to be running an ongoing organization." Merritt B. Fox, CorporateSuccessors Under
Strict Liability: A GeneralEconomic Theory and the Case of CERCLA, 26 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 183, 206 (1991); see also Mark J. Roe, CorporateStrategicReaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA.
L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1986) (describing tendency of management to want to preserve going concern,
whether such a strategy benefits creditors or shareholders).
163
Current creditors' distribution in liquidation, Daiq. equals LV.
164
That is, when LWCC > GWIFC, then Dl > D,.
This will not hold for our hypothetical debtor. See supra notes 153-54. LVICC = 5/14;
GWIFC = 7/10. The latter is greater than the former, and D, of 7 is greater than Dijq of 5. So
current creditors would not prefer piecemeal liquidation to a clean going concern sale.
165While future claimants would be excluded from the bankruptcy distribution in either
case, a quick and dirty going concern sale is still better for future claimants, since some might
be able to recover under state law successor liability rules.
166
That is, when (FC)(P) > GW, then Diiq > Dqd. To see why, recall that Ddis equal to the
scrap value of the business (LV), plus the goodwill (GW), less the successor liability discount
((FC)(Pd)). See supranote 158. Therefore, if the successor liability discount exceeds goodwill,
then Dqd will be less than LV, which is just Dziq, and current creditors will prefer liquidation.
This will not hold for our hypothetical debtor. See supra notes 153, 161. (FC)(P,,) = 2,
while GW= 7. Dqd (equal to 10) is therefore greater than Deq (equal to 5), and current creditors
will prefer
the quick and dirty sale.
67
'
This is the same piecemeal liquidation problem that future claimants have with the
firm's residual claimants outside of bankruptcy under a regime with successor liability, see
supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text, except that in bankruptcy future claimants are residual claimants along with current creditors. Note that under state law a going concern asset sale
is typically "quick and dirty" in the sense that there is no readily available mechanism for ineluding future claims. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. As in the nonbankruptcy
case, piecemeal liquidation not only hurts future claimants, who are left with no recovery, but
may also generate social costs with the destruction of going concern value.
168
Again, we assume no transaction costs for now..
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cant chance that the acquirer would be subject to successor liabil-

ity following a quick and dirty going concern sale.' 69 Second, the

value of the goodwill in the business must be high enough relative
to the aggregate amount of future claims liability to entice current
sale proceeds with future claimclaimants to share going concern
70
ants, rather than liquidate. 1
In effect, future claimants would be included, and their nonbankruptcy rights compromised, only when those nonbankruptcy
rights might be worth something. Only when their successor liability claims have some promise, and the business has sufficient
goodwill to induce current creditors to share going concern value
with future claimants, would future claimants be included in bankruptcy. Their inclusion forces them to take scaled-down bankruptcy distributions worth less in the aggregate than if they had
been free to pursue successor liability claims following bankruptcy.
Conversely, future claimants will be excluded when that is
cheaper for the other parties-that is, when the nonbankruptcy
rights of future claimants are marginal or worthless. When the
overall probability of successor liability outside of bankruptcy is
relatively remote, current creditors and the acquirer will agree to a
quick and dirty sale. When the value of the goodwill is low compared to the aggregate amount of future claims, current creditors
will opt for piecemeal liquidation, and future claims will be excluded. Therefore, preserving future claimants' nonbankruptcy
rights while excluding them from the common pool is an empty
promise. As in the nonbankruptcy context, residual owners-here,
current creditors-will structure
71 the disposition of assets to leave
losses with future claimants. 1
A flexible approach, then, enables current creditors to maximize their own returns at the expense of future claimants. Even
crediting the stated rationale for flexibility-that is, to allow exclusion of future claims if the going concern can be saved without
having to incur the administrative costs of addressing future
claims-there is no guarantee that flexibility will be exercised with
69

1 When Ps > R,, then D, > Dqd. See supranote 160 and accompanying text.
170When

GWIFC > LV/CC, then D, > Dli,. But cf supra note 164 and accompanying text

(explaining when current creditors would rather take the scrap value for themselves).
171 In addition to protecting future claimants from the liability-minimizing strategies of
other parties, mandatory inclusion of future claims puts a premium on the debtor's preservation
of its liability insurance to the extent it has any. Insurance may provide a relatively low-cost
device to insure a source of compensation to future claimants. By contrast, under a flexible
approach, because losses may still be left with the victims, debtors and acquirers have imperfect
incentives to maintain insurance, even though the debtor's existing policy may be available.
See Paris Mfg. Corp. v. Ace Hardware Corp. (In re Paris Indus. Corp.), 132 B.R. 504, 509
(Bankr. D. Maine 1991), discussed infra note 212.
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this end in mind. Current creditors will push for the asset disposition that maximizes their returns, whether that course saves or destroys the going concern, and whether it minimizes transaction
costs or not.
3. Some Observations Concerning TransactionCosts
Incorporating transaction costs complicates the analysis of current
creditors' calculus to some extent, but does not alter the basic conclusion that a flexible approach enables current creditors to leave disproportionate losses with future claimants.
First, piecemeal liquidation will be the least costly in terms of
transaction costs of addressing future claims. Assuming future claimants' exclusion from the liquidation distribution, 172 piecemeal liquidation will incur no future claims transaction costs ("FCTC"). Because going concern sales will incur FCTC as described below,
thereby reducing distributions to current creditors, accounting for
transaction costs suggests that piecemeal liquidation will be even
more attractive to current creditors than previously described under
the zero-transaction-costs assumption.
Comparing FCTC as between the clean sale and the quick and
dirty sale, a few generalizations are possible. In a quick and dirty
sale, the FCTC will consist primarily of future litigation costs the acquirer incurs as future claimants appear to sue for successor liability.
The acquirer will presumably discount its purchase price to account
for the present value of these resolution costs, along with the expected
costs of the successor liability itself-what I have styled the "successor liability discount." If we assume that resolution costs will vary
roughly in proportion to the expected cost of the successor liability
itself, then a small successor liability discount 73 also implies low
FCTC, and a high successor liability discount implies relatively high
FCTC.
By contrast, with the clean sale, absent new approaches to the
handling of future claims, the administrative costs of addressing them
will include a significant fixed component. Certain initial costs must
be incurred regardless of the aggregate amount of future claims liability. For example, retaining a representative for future claimants
and conducting a future claims estimation proceeding will likely generate nontrivial costs, even for cases involving low levels of future
claims liability. Therefore, FCTC will not simply vary proportionally
with future claims liability. Instead, there will be some significant
72

1 See supranote 162 and accompanying text.
173That is, (Fc)(P,)is small.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:435

fixed costs associated with addressing future claims at all, with
"economies of scale" to be realized only at some higher level of aggregate future claims liability. In addition, these fixed costs must be
paid up front as administrative expenses of the case.174 By contrast,
the acquirer's resolution costs of successor liability claims are paid
over time.
These contrasts suggest some cautious observations concerning
the set of possible cases. Consider an ordering of cases based upon
expected successor liability costs under a hypothetical quick and dirty
sale. For cases where the expected costs of successor liability are
low, 175 a quick and dirty sale will generate lower FCTC than a clean
sale. As the aggregate cost of successor liability increases-and with
it, by presumption, aggregate resolution costs-the clean sale will
approach parity with the quick and dirty sale in terms of FCTC efficiency. And somewhere along the spectrum of possible cases, expected successor liability costs and associated resolution costs will be
high enough that a collectivized approach to addressing future claims
will be more efficient, making the clean sale more attractive from the
FCTC perspective.
What can this tell us about our analysis of the flexible approach?
When expected costs of successor liability are low, that means that
preservation of the going concern can be accomplished without accounting for future claims. An acquirer will agree to a quick and
dirty sale because any specter of successor liability that survives to
haunt the acquirer is manageable. A quick and dirty sale will "succeed" in saving the business. And as proponents of the flexible approach note, ignoring future claims avoids the higher FCTC that
would have resulted from attempting to account for them in a clean
sale. However, the factors contributing to this "success" must be examined more closely.
The quick and dirty sale may be possible only because significant
future claims liability is eliminated by the sale and will not survive to
swamp the post-reorganization enterprise in the form of successor
liability claims. The sale has avoided not only certain FCTC but underlying future claims liability as well. Moreover, the more future
claims liability that is wiped out by the sale, the greater also are the
transaction cost savings. But only the latter savings are legitimate;
174See

11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1994).

175Note that this can occur either because (1) FCis low, or (2) even if FCishigh, Pj,is low.

Given the relative unpopularity of successor liability among the courts, see supra notes 46-54
and accompanying text, we may speculate that many, if not most, future claims in cases resulting in a quick and dirty sale will never have to be dealt with by the acquirer. A quick and dirty
bankruptcy sale may wipe out significant future claims liability and associated transaction costs.
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the former are not. With flexibility, current creditors stand to maximize their own recoveries via the quick and dirty sale, both by appropriating future claimants' distributions and by garnering transaction
cost savings.
Will future claims ever be included? Incorporating transaction
costs into our previous analysis suggests that current creditors will
prefer a clean sale if both the aggregate probability 176 and expected
costs of successor liability are high. Only if the aggregate probability
of successor liability is high will a quick and dirty sale fall to eliminate significant future claims liability. Current creditors would therefore have no opportunity to augment their bankruptcy distributions
through significant future claims liability avoidance. Only if the expected costs of successor liability are high will FCTC of the clean
sale be competitive with those of the quick and dirty sale. 177

While transaction costs pose a formidable obstacle to inclusion
of future claims in many cases, a flexible approach provides too
easy a way out. Its initial premise is troubling. If transaction cost
considerations may justify exclusion of future claims, then why
not exclude other creditors on that basis as well? 178 Flexibility enables opportunism in the name of transaction cost savings, because
plan proponents' discretion to exclude future claims is unlimited.
There is therefore no guarantee under a flexible approach that future claims will be included even in large cases that might be able
to support the costs of their inclusion.179 And crafting workable

limits on this discretion would likely be problematic. 180
76

1 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
177If

one of these two conditions fails to obtain, then current creditors' preference will de-

pend on which factor-liability avoidance or FCTC savings/costs-outweighs the other.
In addition, in order to discourage piecemeal liquidation, the goodwill of the business relative to the aggregate amount of future claims liability would have to be significantly greater than
the scrap value of the business relative to the aggregate amount of current claims. That is,
GWIFC >> LVICC. Cf. supra note 170 and accompanying text. The goodwill of the business
would have to be large enough to support both scaled down payments to future claimants and
the transaction costs of including them. Otherwise, current creditors will push to liquidate.
178 No one ever suggested in Texaco's bankruptcy that Penzoil should be excluded because
of the transaction costs associated with liquidating that claim. I am being flip, of course. Addressing that claim was the sole purpose of the bankruptcy. See generally Robert H. Mnookin &
Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v.
Texaco, 75 VA. L. REv. 295 (1989) (describing Texaco bankruptcy and multimillion dollar
litigation costs of Pennzoil dispute that precipitated the filing).
179For example, as a purely legal matter, mass tort debtors like Johns-Manville and A.H.
Robins may have been able to sell their businesses out from under their future tort liabilities.
They could have sold quick and dirty, distributing sale proceeds to current creditors and shareholders, and then liquidated, instead ot reorganizing and addressing future claims. Given the
state of successor liability rules and the transaction costs of the traditional model for including
future claims, shareholder returns might have improved dramatically with a quick and dirty sale.
Liability avoidance on such a massive scale, however, would have generated public outrage and
probably specific legislative sanction. See LoPucki, The Death ofliability,supra note 37, at 5154 (discussing cultural and political constraints on large-scale liability avoidance, noting in short
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The solution must lie in developing more economical approaches to treating future claims, 181 not in leaving to other parties
the discretion to compromise the interests of future claimants in
the name of transaction cost savings. Inclusion of future claims
must not be optional on the part of the debtor, current creditors or
the acquirer of the business, but must be made mandatory in external reorganization. 8 2
4. A Note on Equal Treatment
Related to the mandatory inclusion of future claims is the requirement of equal treatment with other general creditors.18 3 Equal treatment of creditors similarly situated is a central bankruptcy policyl 4
that "all hell would break loose"). That smaller cases fly below the public radar hardly suggests
that liability avoidance on a smaller scale should be acceptable.
180 Cf. Keating, supranote 58 at 1099-1100 (noting difficulty of using relative magnitude of
future claims liability to determine whether to include future claims).
181I suggest possible approaches infra Part V. The best solution may not be a corporate,
bankruptcy or tort law fix. First-party insurance or administrative compensation schemes, for
example, offer plausible alternatives. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, IndividualAction and
Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 906 (1987)
(advocating expanded first-party insurance to compensate mass tort victims); Jennifer H. Arlen,
CompensationSystems and Efficient Deterrence,52 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1115-20 (1993) (comparing administrative compensation scheme with first-party insurance in mass tort context).
182 As an equal treatment rationale would suggest, this mandate should also apply to piecemeal liquidation in Chapter 7. Cf NBRC REPORT, supra note 80, at 321 ("[Mlass future claimants of a debtor liquidating in Chapter 7 ... should be entitled to equal priority with present
claimants."). Admittedly, the relatively steep transaction costs of mandating inclusion of future
claims upon piecemeal liquidation may present the greatest challenge to the conceptual clarity
herein proposed. However, forcing current claimants to share with future claimants regardless
of the form of asset disposition may be necessary to eliminate any strategic incentive on the part
of current claimants to push for piecemeal liquidation when a going concern might survive.
Policing of this mandate in Chapter 7 may be problematic, however, as there will ordinarily be
no going concern acquirer or other party with any stake in assuring that future claimants are
provided for in the Chapter 7 distribution.
183 A rule of equal treatment, of course, does not necessarily answer the detailed questions
concerning what exactly counts as equal. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (Harcourt,
Brace & Co. 1946) ("All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others."). For
example, a twenty percent payout to current creditors upon conclusion of the case may not necessarily require an immediate payout of the same pro rata amounts on behalf of future claims.
Given that future claims by definition will not mature until some time after the business is sold
and the case concluded-that is, future claimants have yet to suffer the harm demanding compensation-their pro rata payout should be discounted to present value.
184 See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also In re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R.
545, 565 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (stating that tort and commercial claimants enjoy equal
standing against debtor's assets and are entitled to share on a pro-rata basis); In re Am Ltd.
Partnership, 140 B.R. 5, 14 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (holding that tort and commercial claimants
"enjoy equal standing against the debtor's assets").
On the other hand, equal treatment has also been described as a "weak" bankruptcy norm.
See Carlson, supra note 31, at 120 n.5 (arguing that in absence of competing policy considerations, foreclosure of future products liability claims is justified by "weak bankruptcy norm in
favor of equality"); see also ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 2.2.2 (1986) (noting
significant exceptions to equal treatment rule in bankruptcy); Roe, Mass Tort, supra note 2, at
855 (concluding that principles of fairness do not unambiguously suggest that future tort claim-
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In external reorganization, all general unsecured creditors should
share available sale proceeds pro rata. Future claimants and other tort
creditors should therefore be treated on a par with other unsecured
creditors. 115
One might oppose this requirement on the ground that it overcompensates future claimants, giving them rights in bankruptcy that they
do not enjoy outside of bankruptcy. Professor Davis argues that future claimants' prospects of recovery outside of bankruptcy are so
dim, given the vagaries of successor liability law and the possibility
of the debtor's piecemeal liquidation, that an equal treatment rule
would "overvalue' future claims. Outside of bankruptcy, future
claimants may be vulnerable to dissolution strategies to which present
claimants would not. "If these future claims were to have a right to
participate equally with present claims, this would
amount to a sub186
stantive right to improve their state law position."'
Assuming the state law outcome is the proper benchmark for com-

parison,187 and taking Professor Davis's argument on its own terms, it

ants must be included in mass tort reorganization in order to assure temporal equality of treatment).
I agree with Professor Smith that fairness principles require equal treatment among current
and future tort claimants. See Smith, supra note 8, at 378-82 (deriving equal treatment norm
from Rawlsian hypothetical bargain analysis). And regardless of what other contexts may demand, as the following footnote explains, external reorganization presents the strongest case for
equal treatment among all unsecured creditors.
1 This distributional prescription follows naturally from a rule of mandatory inclusion of
future claims. When the business is sold for cash, there is no reorganization-related justification
for disparate treatment among groups of unsecured creditors. Cf.Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus.
Neg. Comm. v. United States Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 586-87 (6th Cir.
1986) (requiring some functional distinction among creditors in order to justify separate classification in internal reorganization plan).
This fairness-based equal treatment approach may be said to go farther than other proposals
advocating mandatory inclusion of future claims insofar as it advances a distributional prescription across all unsecured creditor groups. Others either make no distributional claim-relying
on other rationales for mandatory inclusion-or limit their distributional prescriptions to equity
among tort claims, without focusing specifically on the external reorganization context. See
supra note 90 and accompanying text. However, I suspect that in the external reorganization
context, my distributional prescription would be uncontroversial to advocates for mandatory
inclusion.
186Davis, supranote 78, at 366. Professor Davis argues both that future claims need not be
included in the bankruptcy process, and that if included, they need not be treated equally with
current creditors, but only "fairly, in a way that is at least commensurate with their prospects
under state law." Id. at 366-67.
187 Traditionally, nonbankruptcy outcomes have been relied upon as the appropriate
baseline against which to track bankruptcy outcomes. See Butuer v. United States, 440 U.S. 48
(1979).
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest
requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed
differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts within a
State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a
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proves too much. The rule of equal treatment always improves the
position of some creditors as compared to their would-be positions
under state law. In the race of diligence outside of bankruptcy,188
certain creditors are always advantaged over others. When the equal
treatment regime is triggered by the bankruptcy filing, creditors who
would otherwise win the race to seize the debtor's assets always lose
out, and creditors who would lose under state law benefit.1 89 That
future claimants are vulnerable outside of bankruptcy does not distinguish them from many current creditors.
For example, small trade creditors are typically disadvantaged
compared to institutional lenders. Institutional lenders include reporting requirements and covenant defaults in their lending documents. Their monitoring of the debtor's financial and operational
19°
performance will be much more active than that of trade creditors.
They will typically realize higher percentage recoveries under state
law collection rules than small trade creditors. No one suggests that
this circumstance justifies systematic favoritism of institutional lenders' unsecured claims in bankruptcy, or the systematic disfavoring of
small trade creditors.
Are future claims different in kind from current claims, such that
unequal treatment may be justified? After all, future claimants typically have no enforcement rights against the debtor outside of bankruptcy.1 91 Because future claimants could not even get to the starting
party from receiving "a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.
Id. at 55 (citing Lewis v. Manufacturers National Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)); see also
Baird & Jackson, supra note 55, at 110 (asserting that "bankruptcy law is primarily concerned
with recognizing nonbankruptcy entitlements").
However, that traditional baseline has recently been called into question. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1945-47 (1994) [hereinafter
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain]. Professor LoPucki asserts that as a practical
matter, most unsecured creditors have no substantive state law rights against the debtor's assets.
For their repayment, they rely instead on procedural rights to extract payment from the debtor's
encumbered cash flow, a practice he calls "cash-flow surfing." Because unsecured creditors
have no substantive rights of any significance, attempting to replicate such rights in bankruptcy
is futile. See id.
188See supranote 57 and accompanying text.
189Moreover, a fundamental purpose of the preference rules and the automatic stay is to
discourage this destructive race to dismember the debtor. "If preferences are tolerated, a firm
may be dismembered before bankruptcy and have no chance to survive as a going concern, even
though everyone would have been better off if it had. Preference law exists because it deters
gun-jumping." DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 425 (2d ed. 1990).

190See Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeridersin Commercial and CorporateSettings, 92
YALE L.J. 49, 53, 72 (1982) (noting relatively superior monitoring abilities of institutional
creditors and bondholder trustees, and relatively inferior monitoring abilities of employees and
occasional suppliers).
191As Professor Davis notes:
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line to compete in the race of diligence, this disability might justify
their less favorable treatment in bankruptcy. However, this bright
line between current and future claimants blurs upon closer inspection. Future claimants do have rights under state law. In some states,
a cause of action may accrue simply on the basis of exposure to a
hazard, even before injuries have developed. 192 Future claimants, as

contingent creditors, may also fall within the protections of the
fraudulent transfer laws. 193 At least one state, Delaware, requires that
provision be made for future claimants upon a corporation's dissolution.194 And finally, the nonbankruptcy analog brings us full circle,
since successor liability may be available outside of bankruptcy to
compensate future claimants despite their ostensible disability in the
race of diligence. 195

More generally, rather than focusing on ways that future claimants may be exploited under state law to decide their proper bankruptcy treatment, we need only recognize their status as creditors
in order to conclude that they deserve equal treatment. While discounting their claims to present value seems appropriate, it seems
inappropriate to discount them-and only them-based on creditor
vulnerabilities under state law, vulnerabilities that bankruptcy is
specifically designed to ameliorate.

Mhe owners may choose to dismantle the company, selling it off piecemeal. In
these instances, present claimants will be able to employ a number of devices, such
as attachment, execution, fraudulent conveyance law, injunction or receivership, to
protect their prospective recovery. Future claims, in contrast, would have no say in
the matter. If a claim cannot yet be asserted, the claimant is powerless to affect the
legitimate affairs of its future obligor.
Davis, supra note 78, at 365.
192For example, Judge Posner noted in In re UNR Indus., 725 F.2d 1111 (7th
Cir. 1983),
that medical evidence exists that shows microscopic injury to the body as soon as asbestos fibers
lodge in the lungs, and that "states differ on whether a cause of action in an asbestosis case
accrues upon inhalation or not until there is palpable disease or the disease is discovered." Id. at
1119 (citations omitted); see also Roe, Mass Tort, supra note 2, at 896 n.153 (suggesting that in
some states, a cause of action accrues upon mere exposure to a hazard, even without manifestation of injury).
193See American Sur. Co. v. Marotta, 287 U.S. 513 (1933) (noting common law rule that
creditor with only contingent claim is nonetheless protected against fraudulent conveyance);
UNit. FRAUDULENT TRANSfERS ACT § 1(3) (defining "claim" to include contingent and unmatured 94rights to payment).
1 See supranote 34.
195 Moreover, successor liability may sometimes favor future claimants over current credi-

tors in the state law race. See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text. However, that does
not suggest that future claimants should do better in bankruptcy than other creditors.
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E. Inadequacyof Refonn Proposals
Some advocates for the flexible approach overlook the potential
for opportunism in external reorganization.1 96 The NBC proposal
fails even to explain its flexible approach, 197 let alone analyze possible problems of strategic behavior. The NBRC proposal, while noting the desirability of treating all claimants equally whether reorganization is accomplished internally or externally by way of sale, 198 fails
to account for the possibility of a quick and dirty sale. Under the

NBRC proposal, an acquirer qualifies for formal insulation from successor liability only if sufficient protections are provided for future
claimants in the bankruptcy proceeding. 199 So far, so good. However, the proposal too optimistically finds this requirement sufficient
to preclude the parties from "act[ing] strategically to disadvantage
one class of claimants. ' 2 ° It fails to consider that when successor
liability risk is low, the parties will not need a bankruptcy injunction
to cut off the rights of future claimants. As in the nonbankruptcy
context, the sale itself and subsequent distribution to current creditors
will suffice.
IV.

SUCCESSOR LIABIlTY AND EXTERNAL REORGANIZATION

Provided that future claimants share ratably in the bankruptcy sale
proceeds, then as with other creditors, future claimants' rights in external reorganization should be exclusive. Their successor liability
rights must be extinguished. Bankruptcy courts have resorted to the

196 Professor Davis has noted the perilous consequences for future claimants excluded from
external reorganization. See Davis, supra note 78, at 367 ("It is in a sale, as opposed to a reorganization, that future claims are in the greatest danger of losing their fair share."). He also
notes the strategic incentives of current creditors to exclude future claims. See id. However, this
predicament does not disturb him as much as it does me. He seems content to let future claimants take their chances under state law successor liability rules. See id. at 371-72. I critique his
approach supra Part Ill(D)(4).
197See supra note 96; see also Kathryn R. Heidt, Comment, Future Claims
in Bankruptcy:
The NBC Amendments Do Not Go FarEnough, 69 AM. BANKR. LJ.515, 519 (1995) [hereinafter Heidt, The NBC Amendments] (criticizing flexible approach advocated in original edition
of NBC Final Report, which "leaves too much control over the treatment of future claims in the
hands of the plan proponent").
198
See NBRC REPORT, supranote 80, at 348-50.
199

The Proposal would prevent a debtor or trustee from selling off the major assets of
the business and cutting off mass future claimants' access unless the debtor satisfied
the requirements for treating mass future claims. Without the appointment of a mass
future claims representative, for example, the successor would not be protected from
liability for mass future claims.
Id. at 349.
2oo
Id.
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channeling injunction 2° l to permanently enjoin successor liability
claims, while channeling future claims to a trust or other payment

mechanism established to satisfy such claims as they mature.
Bankruptcy theorists support this resolution. 2°2 However, its
legal basis is unclear. The channeling injunction is not obviously
authorized by the Code in the external reorganization context, and

prominent courts have questioned the permissibility of bankruptcy
court injunctions against successor liability actions. This Part argues that authority for enjoining successor liability claims in external reorganization is well within the general equitable powers of
the bankruptcy court.2
A. CurrentConfusion

A going concern sale in bankruptcy will typically occur in Chapter 11.204 It is typically effected either pursuant to the debtor's general authority to deal with estate property in bankruptcy, 20 5 or through

201This term was coined in the mass tort bankruptcies. Channeling injunctions have been
used both in internal reorganization in connection with the Chapter 11 discharge, and in external
reorganization, where no discharge applies. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
2 See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supranote 56, at 53 ("The preferable solution.., is
to include the nonmanifested tort victims in the bankruptcy process as holders of claims, so they
get to share in the assets, but then to sell the assets free of all such claims."); Baird, The Uneasy
Case, supra note 5, at 145-46 ("A sale of assets to a third party must be free of all claims against
it. Those who have claims against the firm must satisfy themselves out of the proceeds of the
sale. If they are able to pursue the assets at a later time, the price that can be realized from the
sale will be depressed."); Carlson, supra note 31, at 145 (arguing for bankruptcy foreclosure of
"products liability servitude"); Heidt, Changing Paradigm,supra note 11, at 1084 (asserting
that successor liability law is inconsistent with bankruptcy policy); Jackson, TranslatingAssets
and Liabilities,supra note 80, at 96-97 (stating that successorship doctrine is unnecessary when
unproved tort claims share in bankruptcy distribution).
203Section 105(a) describes the bankruptcy court's general equitable powers. "The court
may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994). The purpose is "to assure the bankruptcy courts'
power to take whatever action is appropriate or necessary in aid of the exercise of their jurisdiction." 2 COLLER ON BANKRUPTCY 105.01 (15th ed. 1997). This power is not limitless. Its
exercise must be consistent with the provisions of the Code. It "does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or
constitute a roving commission to do equity." United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th
Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
2 The sale could theoretically occur in Chapter 7. However, as Professor Baird has noted,
going concern sales in Chapter 7 are rare. "As a practical matter, ... we never see 'goingconcern' liquidations in Chapter 7. The managers of a corporation prefer the control and the
presumption of continued operation that exists in Chapter 11. They will not file a Chapter 7
petition as long as they harbor any hope for the firm." BAIRD, supra note 89, at 16.
205"The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary
course of business, property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1994). While section 363
refers to the trustee's authority, under section 1107(a), the debtor in possession is authorized to
run the business in Chapter 11, with the rights and powers of a trustee. See id. § 1107(a).
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a liquidating plan.2 °6 Section 363(f) is often relied upon for authority
to sell the assets "free and clear" of all liens and claims, 2W including
successor liability claims.20 8 However, whether a successor liability
claim qualifies as an "interest in property" referred to in the statute is
doubtful.209 The Chapter 11 discharge is also unavailable in this
206A liquidating plan calls for the sale of all or substantially all assets of the estate and
payment of creditor claims from the sale proceeds. Such a plan is authorized under section
1123(b)(4). See id. § 1123(b)(4); see also infra note 211 and accompanying text.
207 Section 363(f) provides that the trustee may sell estate property free and clear of any interest in such property of any entity other than the estate only if:
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of
such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater
than the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a
money satisfaction of such interest.
IIU.S.C. § 363(f) (1994).
203 Sales free and clear of successor liability claims have been authorized by bankruptcy
courts under section 3 63(f) even though future claims were ignored. See, e.g., Western Auto
Supply Co. v. Savage Arms, Inc. (In re Savage Indus., Inc.), 43 F.3d 714 (1st Cir. 1994) (overruling bankruptcy court holding that section 363(f) authorizes injunction against successor liability claims where tort victims never received notice of bankruptcy); American Living Sys. v.
Bonapfel (In re All American of Ashburn, Inc.), 56 B.R. 186, 189 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.), affd sub
nom. Griffin v. Bonapfel, 805 F.2d 1515 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (finding that sale of assets "free and
clear of all claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)" precludes successor products liability claim
against asset purchaser) (emphasis supplied); see also In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d
573 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that "successor in interest" liability for benefit plan premium under
Coal Act constitutes "interest in property," such that section 363(f) authorizes bankruptcy sale
free and clear of such liability); WBQ Partnership v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Med.
Assistance Servs. (In re WBQ Partnership), 189 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (finding that
section 363(f) authorizes bankruptcy sale of substantially all debtor's assets, free and clear of
state agency's state law right to proceed against asset purchaser for depreciation recapture relating to Medicaid cost reimbursements previously received by debtor); Lee R. Bogdanoff, The
Purchaseand Sale of Assets in ReorganizationCases-OfInterest and Principal,of Principles
and Interests, 47 Bus. LAW. 1367, 1419 (1992) (proposing that "greater" power to sell assets
free and clear of liens under section 363(f) should include "lesser" power to sell assets free and
clear of successor liability "interests").
209 See, e.g., Zerand-Bemal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner,
CJ.) (finding that sale pursuant to section 363(f) may cleanse assets of liens and other encumbrances, but not successor product liability claims); Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In re
Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that section 363(f)
sale may only extinguish in rem interests which have attached to property, but not in personam
liabilities such as "trailing" tort liability), vacated, 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998);
Wilkerson v. C.O. Porter Machinery Co., 567 A.2d 598 (NJ. Super. 1989) (finding that section 363(f) does not address successor liability claims); see also Western Auto Supply Co. v.
Savage Arms, Inc. (In re Savage Indus., Inc.), 43 F.3d 714 (Ist Cir. 1994) (explicitly reserving
question of whether section 363(f) enables extinguishment of state law successor "product-line"
liability claims, while holding that because of inadequate notice to such claimants, their claims
survived against both the debtor and asset purchaser); Volvo White Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage, Inc. (In re White Motor Credit Corp.), 75 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1987) (holding that section 363(f) only authorizes sales free and clear of specific interests in
property being sold, but is inapplicable to sales free and clear of tort claims or other general
unsecured claims, as such claimants have no specific interest in property; but that authority for
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Chapter 11 dis-

charge is reserved for debtors reorganizing internally.2 1° The liquidating debtor, by contrast, is left with no business to run and therefore
does not need a discharge. n
sale free and clear of successor liability may be found in section 105(a), and is coextensive with
power to discharge claims under plan of reorganization).
The NBC and NBRC each recommend amendment of section 363 in order to make clear
that asset sales under that provision would be free and clear of successor liability claims, provided that future claims were included in the bankruptcy proceeding and accorded proper treatment. See NBC FINAL REPORT, supranote 80, at 41-42; NBRC REPORT, supranote 80, at 34750. One problem with this approach is that at the time of any asset sale under section 363, the
specific bankruptcy treatment of future claims will probably not have been decided yet-and
almost certainly not documented in any binding fashion. Therefore, any free and clear sale
order would necessarily be conditional, and would ultimately need to be supplemented by a
permanent channeling injunction at the end of the case. Or if no free and clear sale order could
issue until treatment of future claims had been determined, that would ordinarily be at a point
late in the case, such that a permanent injunction could issue with, or shortly after issuance of,
the free and clear sale order. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 80, at 350 ("[E]ntering a free and
clear order would entail a finding that the debtor satisfied the requisite standards for treating
mass future claims."). These proposals, then, would not in practice differ much from the channeling injunction approach described herein.
210 With internal reorganization, the Chapter 11 discharge is probably effective to preclude
successor liability claims, assuming future claims are dealt with in the case. As the court stated
in Volvo White Truck Corp. v. ChambersburgBeverage, Inc. (In re White Motor Credit Corp.),
75 B.R. 944 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987):
The liability which state law imposes through successor liability is that of the manufacturer. The federal purpose of final resolution and discharge of corporate debt is
clearly compromised by imposing successor liability on purchasers of assets when
the underlying liability has been discharged under a plan of reorganization. Moreover, successor liability is precluded by Section 1141(c) which specifically frees debtors' property from creditors' claims. Successor liability in these circumstances has,
therefore, been pre-empted by the Bankruptcy Code.
Id. at 950-51. The reorganization plan at issue had made provision for future claims. See id. at
947; Conway v. White Trucks, 885 F.2d 90, 91 (3d Cir. 1989) (describing provision for future
claims). Ironically, however, the claim at issue was not a future claim but a claim involving a
preconfirmation accident. The tort victim filed a proof of claim but also attempted to sue Volvo
as a successor. See Volvo White Truck, 75 B.R. at 947.
211 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c), (d)(3) (1994). Section 1141(d)(3)
provides that:
The confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor if(A) the plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the property
of the estate;
(B) the debtor does not engage in business after consummation of the plan; and
(C) the debtor would be denied a discharge under section 727(a) of this title if
the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (1994).
A plan would probably be considered a liquidating plan if it called for sale of all or substantiaily all of the debtor's assets-whether sold as a going concern or piecemeal. Section
I141(d)(3) is a "corollary provision" to section727(a), see 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1141.05[3], at 1141-49 (15th rev. ed. 1997), which precludes any entity liquidating in Chapter
7 from receiving a Chapter 7 discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1994). This Chapter 7 prohibition does not depend on whether the Chapter 7 trustee sells the assets piecemeal or as a
going concern. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to expect that the corollary prohibition of
section 1141(d)(3) would result in a similar outcome-that is, denial of a discharge to a Chapter
11 debtor that is left with no assets or business to run. See also Michigan Employment Sec.
Comm'n v. Wolverine Radio Co., Inc. (In re Wolverine Radio Co.), 930 F.2d 1132, 1147 n.21
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This lack of explicit statutory authority for the channeling injunction, coupled with the fact that future claims are ordinarily ignored in
external reorganization, has led some courts to issue broad pronouncements declaring bankruptcy's inability to affect successor liability claims.
When future claimants are excluded from bankruptcy's collective
settlement, courts have almost uniformly-and quite correctly-held
that the preceding bankruptcy could not affect their rights. 212 Barring
successor liability claims in that context would violate fundamental
notions of due process, eliminating future claimants' rights through
legal proceedings of which they received no notice and in which they
were unrepresented. 3 By contrast, postbankruptcy successor liability-if available under the applicable state law-enables tort victims
to be compensated. As in the nonbankruptcy context, it prevents the
firm from using a sale and liquidation to leave losses from productrelated injuries with the future victims. The necessity for successor
liability would not appear to be affected by the fact of a bankruptcy
that failed to consider future claimants' rights.2t 4

(6th Cir. 1991) ("A corporation in Chapter 11 that does not continue in business after plan
confirmation
does not receive a discharge.").
2 12
See, e.g., Western Auto Supply Co. v. Savage Arms, Inc. (In re Savage Indus., Inc.), 43
F.3d 714 (1st Cir. 1994); Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1994);
Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1995), vacated, 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998); cf.Paris Mfg. Corp. v. Ace Hardware Corp. (In re Paris Indus. Corp.), 132 B.R. 504 (D. Maine 1991). In Paris,the district court
upheld the bankruptcy court's injunction against interim claimants' prosecution of their state
court products liability suit despite the fact that no bankruptcy notice was given. The court
reasoned that the claimants were not prejudiced by the lack of notice, since they were not challenging the adequacy of the sale proceeds, which were insufficient to pay any unsecured claims.
Instead, the claimants complained that the trustee had canceled the debtor's products liability
insurance that would have covered their claims. Had they received notice of the sale, the claimants would have appeared before the court in order to persuade the trustee to maintain the insurance. See id. at 509.
Another issue that has arisen is whether the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to enjoin a
successor liability suit after the bankruptcy case has been closed. Compare Zerand-Bemal
Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding lack of jurisdiction), with Volvo White
Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage, Inc. (In re White Motor Credit Corp.), 75 B.R. 944
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (finding jurisdiction). That issue will not be addressed herein.
213See In re Savage Indus., Inc., 43 F.3d at 720 n.9.
The Code "notice" requirements have even greater force in a case like the present,
where the order approving the proposed sale authorized a transfer of substantially all
chapter 11 estate assets-for present purposes, the functional equivalent of an order
confirming a conventional chapter 11 reorganization plan. As such, the order confirming a chapter 11 liquidation sale warrants especial bankruptcy court scrutiny.
Id.
214 Assuming the debtor is insolvent, successor liability in this context will prefer future
claimants over current creditors. However, this successor liability threat may be necessary to
provide the proper inducement to current creditors and the acquirer to include future claims. See
infra Part V(C).
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Unfortunately, that future claims are typically ignored in external
reorganization has led some courts to conclude that future claims may
never be affected in external reorganization. Under this view, exter-

nal reorganization is ineffective to foreclose successor liability
claims, even if provision were made for payment of future claims
along with other claims against the debtor.
The case of Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox2 5 provides an example.2 16 The Seventh Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court's conclu-

sion that it lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction barring successor
liability claims brought four and a half years after the bankruptcy sale
at issue.217 While future claims had been ignored in the bankruptcy,
the appellate court opined that even if future claimants had been provided for, their successor liability claims could not have been en-

joined.2 18 The court found no statutory authority for such an injunction. 219 The court was also unimpressed with the notion that the threat
of successor liability would depress sale prices for assets in bankruptcy. To allow the court to enjoin successor liability claims on that

basis would justify:
a blanket power to enjoin all future lawsuits against a buyer at

a bankruptcy sale in order to maximize the sale price: more,
that the court could in effect immunize such buyers from all
state and federal laws that might reduce the value of the assets
bought from the bankrupt.Y
This sort of unlimited power would provide "incentive to enter bankruptcy for reasons that have nothing to do with the purposes of bankruptcy law."' The court concluded that bankruptcy can never affect
successor liability claims.m2
21523

F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.).
also Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union Pension Fund

216See

v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48 (7th Cir. 1995); R.C.M. Executive Gallery Corp. v. Rols Capital
Co., 901 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Wilkerson v. C.O. Porter Machinery Co., 567 A.2d 598
(NJ. Super. 1989).
217 The original sale agreement approved by the bankruptcy court was by its terms made
subject to the court's reservation of jurisdiction to enjoin subsequent successor liability claims.
Zerand-Bernal,23 F.3d at 161.
218 Judge Posner has in other circumstances, however, been more receptive to bankruptcy
treatment of future claims. See supra note 125.
219 The court cites to 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1994) for the proposition that discharge applies
only to protect the debtor. However, as already mentioned, the liquidating debtor does not
receive a discharge in any event. The channeling injunction does not depend on the debtor's
discharge. See infra Part IV(B).
220
21 Zerand-Bernal,23 F.3d at 163.
2

id.

According to the court, no bankruptcy mechanism is necessary to foreclose future claimants' successor liability claims, since inclusion of future claims in the bankruptcy would have
rendered successor liability unavailable as a matter of state law. "[Tihe successorship doctrine
222
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Because future claims were excluded in Zerand, survival of successor liability was the correct result.223 However, contrary to the
court's assertion, in the proper circumstances an injunction against
successor liability is central to the purposes of bankruptcy law. The
channeling injunction is the functional equivalent in external reorganization to the Chapter 11 discharge in internal reorganization.224
Although the liquidating debtor is not entitled to a discharge and does
not need one, the going concern that survives external reorganization
does require insulation from the debtor's preconfirmation obligations.
An understanding of the role of Chapter 11 discharge will make the
point.
B. Chapter11 Dischargeand the Channeling Injunction
1. FunctionalParallels
Unlike an individual debtor in consumer bankruptcy, a corporation
reorganizing in Chapter 11 does not get a fresh start. 2 5 It does not
emerge from bankruptcy with a clean slate. Its slate will only be as
clean as creditors are willing to allow. Moreover, creditors negotiate
not only with the debtor concerning treatment of their respective
claims in reorganization. As important, they also negotiate with each
other, apportioning what all understand is a fixed pool of value. The
process is multilateral, with settlement among creditors as a critical
feature. What any creditor receives depends to a great extent on what
other creditors are willing to give up.
Because of this creditor interdependence, Chapter 11 discharge
functions not only to shield the emerging debtor from its creditors'
prebankruptcy claims, but also to protect creditors from each other.
The discharge insulates the postconfirmation going concern from pre-

...is inapplicable if the plaintiff had a chance to obtain a legal remedy against the predecessor,
even so limited a remedy as that afforded by the filing of a claim in bankruptcy." Id. This assertion concerning state law outcomes may not be universally true. See Wilkerson v. C.O. Porter
Machinery Co., 567 A.2d 598 (NJ. Super. 1989) (finding that application of postbankruptcy
successor liability was unaffected by whether future claimant had received distribution in bankruptcy)
ILI-The court was correct in noting that the possibility of depressed asset sale bids could not
justify "allow[ing] the parties to bankruptcy sales to extinguish the rights of third parties, here
future tort claimants, without notice to them or (as notice might well be infeasible) any consideration of their interests." Zerand-Bernal,23 F.3d at 163.
224 See supranote 73-74 and accompanying text (concerning the parallels between
internal
and external reorganization).
225 See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LITrrs, supra note 56, at 191 ("Corporations that reorganize
under chapter 11 do, to be sure, receive a discharge.... [Hlowever, it is wrong to conclude that
the reasons for such discharge are derived from a financial fresh-start policy.") (citations omitted).
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confirmation claims, thereby preserving for creditors the value of
their respective postconfirmation stakes in the reorganized debtor that
were negotiated as part of the plan. The discharge operates to enforce
the finality of the collective settlement. 226 It limits each creditor to its
agreed share of the common pool.
The channeling injunction performs this same function in external
reorganization. Whether the going concern is ultimately owned by
prebankruptcy creditors or third parties or some combination, all involved must be assured of the finality of any collective settlement.
Where creditors as a group opt to cash out by selling the going concern to a third party, the future claims channeling injunction serves

that purpose.2 7 It assures each creditor, including each future claimant, that no other creditor may appropriate more than its share of the

common pool. m
2. The ChannelingInjunction and Bankruptcy Norms
Absent a channeling injunction, some future claimants may stand
to recover infull from the acquirer. However, such recoveries come
at the expense of the common pool, as a result of the acquirer's successor liability discount.2 9 This dampening of bids for the business
frustrates bankruptcy's attempt to maximize recoveries for creditors
226
See BAIRD, supra note 89, at 69 ('The discharge ...is necessary to rearrange the firm's
capital structure. One cannot recapitalize a firm unless all existing rights against it are canceled
and new ones are issued in their stead.").
227
Cf Baird & Jackson, supra note 55, at 110 n.45. Professors Baird and Jackson describe
the role of the corporate discharge in Chapter I1 as a device to effect parity among the various
asset deployment choices that are available to the debtor's investors. Internal reorganization is
in effect a going concern "sale" in which creditors sell the firm to themselves, foregoing their
prebankruptcy claims against the debtor's assets in exchange for their agreed plan consideration.
The discharge enables this "sale" of assets free of prebankruptcy claims, in the same way that
sale to a third party and dissolution would effect this outcome outside of bankruptcy. Without
the discharge in Chapter 11 reorganization, the debtor's investors could not make an unbiased
decision concerning asset deployment, since only disposition to a third party would be effective
to free the assets from their presale liabilities. Id.
Successor liability, ironically, raises the converse problem. Unlike most corporate liabilities, successor liability claims may survive the sale and dissolution outside of bankruptcy. But
they probably do not survive the Chapter 11 discharge if the debtor reorganizes internally and
includes future claims in the proceeding. See supra note 210. Absent the channeling injunction,
successor liability claims would also survive the going concern sale in Chapter 11, that is, the
"external reorganization.' Therefore, the channeling injunction is necessary to equalize treatment of future claims as between internal and external reorganization.
228 Moreover, under this approach, section 1141(c) may provide statutory authority for the
channeling injunction. It states that "after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the
plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors." 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (1994). The
statute contains an exception relating to the corporate debtor's ineligibility for discharge in the
case of a liquidating plan. However, as the analysis in the text suggests, the appropriateness of
the channeling injunction should not depend on the debtor's eligibility for discharge, and section
1141(c) may plausibly be interpreted consistently with this idea.
229
See supra notes 49-53, 160-61 and accompanying text.
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as a group. Sale of the going concern may depend on bankruptcy's
ability to include future claims and foreclose attendant successor liability rights. Disability in this regard may inhibit any sale and imperil the survival of the business-the very same problem created by
successor liability outside of bankruptcy.230
Survival of successor liability claims also creates equal treatment
problems. The successor liability discount may draw 100-cent dollars
from the common pool to pay future claims liability not satisfied in
bankruptcy. The future claimant stands to have her claim paid in full
by the successor following bankruptcy, while "like" current creditors
receive only partial satisfaction from a diminished pool of sale proceeds. 23 1 The future claimant is thereby accorded priority
treatment,
232
an outcome inconsistent with the equal treatment norm.
The channeling injunction assures that the proceeds from selling
the business will not be diminished by the threat of postbankruptcy
successor liability suits, and that no future claimant will be able to
obtain more than her due at the expense of other creditors.
Moreover, any external reorganization could be structured as an
internal reorganization in order to assure a Chapter 11 discharge. The
third-party acquirer, instead of purchasing the debtor's business outright, could contribute the purchase price to the internally reorganized
entity in exchange for its new common stock. The discharge would
hold future claimants to the terms of the collective settlement. It
would foreclose the rights of future claimants against the reorganized
entity, as long as future claims were provided for in the plan.233 Insulation of the going concern from the claims of prepetition creditors,

230See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. Professor Carlson discusses this problem

of effective foreclosure rules, noting that the rules must provide for the termination of enough
pre-existing interests in the property subject to sale, such that a prospective purchaser is given
something worth buying. See Carlson, supranote 31, at 121.
231"The successor liability specter would chill and deleteriously affect sales of corporate assets, forcing debtors to accept less on sales to compensate for this potential liability. This negative effect on sales would only benefit product liability claimants, thereby subverting specific
statutory priorities established by the Bankruptcy Code." Volvo White Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage, Inc. (In re White Motor Credit Corp.), 75 B.R. 944, 951 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1987).
22 See Heidt, The NBC Amendments, supra note 197, at 520. Moreover, the future tort victim is preferred over the current tort victim, though the same debtor conduct is responsible for
both injuries. "Only serendipity explains why one claimant is bound by the plan, while the
other is permitted to pursue full recovery, based only upon the timing of the injury, and serendipity seems a poor decisional point for such a major policy choice." Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v.
Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 918 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995), vacated,
220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998). A similar problem of differential treatment occurs if
future claims are not all included in bankruptcy. See supra notes 85, 87-89 and accompanying
text.
233See supranote 210.
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however, should not depend on the form of the reorganization or the
structuring of the sale transaction.2m
Provided that the collective settlement in bankruptcy includes future claimants, then that settlement should foreclose their rights
against the going concern. The channeling injunction does that.
5 such an injunction
Contrary to the court's assertions in Zerand,23
would not purport to enjoin "all future lawsuits" against an acquirer,
but only those of future claimants whose rights had been recognized
in bankruptcy. It would not purport to bind all creditors of the acquirer, but only future claimants, who are primarily creditors of the
debtor.
C. Future Claimants' Position
We might sympathize with the future tort victim whose injury
manifests itself only long after the corporate tortfeasor has disappeared. 36 Even when she is included in the bankruptcy distribution,

234The proposal of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission makes the same point.
See NBRC REPORT, supranote 80, at 350.
In fact, there may be good reason not to force a contrived internal reorganization on a thirdparty acquirer for the sole purpose of foreclosing future claims. Internal reorganization is ordinarily expensive. It typically requires either (1) formal valuation of both the going concern and
any "tickets" issued to prebankruptcy creditors in consideration for their claims, see generally
Clark, supra note 73, at 1252-54, or (2) multilateral negotiation in order to avoid the cost and
uncertainty of such formal valuations. See Roe, Successor Liability, supranote 36, at 1570 n.28
("[T]he task of valuation is so onerous, unpredictable, and ill-suited to judicial treatment that
one might argue that the current framework for corporation reorganization in chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code was constructed largely to avoid the difficulties ofjudicial valuation.").
By contrast, the sale of the going concern to a third party generally avoids these valuation
questions, as well as the costs of strategic behavior inherent in plan negotiation. The typical
sale consideration will be cash or marketable securities, whose value is readily ascertainable.
Once the business is sold, the question of its value is answered. The distribution will follow
absolute priority, with little room to haggle over valuation. See Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra
note 5, at 139 (noting that while outright sale in bankruptcy eliminates valuation and distribution
issues, internal reorganization requires a complex proceeding fraught with opportunities for
strategic behavior by parties in interest).
Forcing the parties to cast their transaction as an internal reorganization might leave room
for disgruntled parties to reopen issues-valuation, for example-that would be foreclosed in a
straight sale via a liquidating plan. That would unnecessarily increase the costs of the transaction for all interested parties. It might force the acquirer, an outsider, to have to navigate
through the internecine conflicts among prebankruptcy creditors and equityholders. In the worst
case, it might saddle the acquirer with the burden of having to negotiate a capital structure with
"lenders" not of her own choosing, when ex hypothesi she would have been willing to pay cash
for the business.
23 See supranote 220 and accompanying text.
26 While voluntary creditors have some ability to diversify across more than one borrower
and to "adjus' for credit risk, tort victims do not choose their "borrowers"-i.e., their tortfeasors. Tort creditors are therefore in a precarious position, and future tort creditors even more so.
See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 136-39 (4th ed. 1991) (describing how diversification reduces unsystematic risk);
Reinier H. Kraakman, CorporateLiability Strategiesand the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE
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her share of the common pool may not be enough to compensate fully
for her injuries. But the impulse to compensate future tort claimants

through successor liability has no conceptual justification following
bankruptcy.

Recognizing the special vulnerability of tort creditors does not
justify divergent treatment as between current and future claimants, or
between current and future tort victims. In the context of external
reorganization, successor liability favors future over current claimants, including known tort victims. It enables full recovery only for
future tort victims. It does not operate to favor tort and other involuntary claimants over contract creditors. It effectively shifts losses
from future claimants-providing them full compensation-to the
tortfeasor's residual claimants. But in bankruptcy, the residual claimants will be other creditors, including the future claimants' fellow tort
victims whose injuries have already appeared, as well as other involuntary creditors. Commentators have argued for special treatment of
tort creditors generally.23 7 However, short of any fundamental
change, tort creditors are merely unsecured creditors under the current
system. The future tort victim deserves no less, but also no more,
than the current tort victim or other unsecured creditor.
As with the debtor's other creditors, future claimants' ratable share
of the common pool should be their exclusive recovery. The court's

power to enjoin successor liability claims as part of an external reorganization should therefore be co-extensive with the scope of the discharge of claims in internal reorganization 23 8 That future tort victims

Li. 857, 870 (1984) ("[Tort victims... cannot protect themselves by refusing the firm 'credit'
or by demanding a security interest in firm property before accidents.").
7 Recognizing that tort creditors are different from contract creditors, theorists have proposed special treatment for tort claimants-either modification of corporate limited liability
rules with respect to tort claimants, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited ShareholderLiability for CorporateTorts, 100 YALE LJ. 1879, 1907 (1991) (advocating
pro rata shareholder liability for tort obligations), the granting to tort claimants of priority over
secured and/or other contract creditors, see LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain,supra
note 187, or both. See David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991).
238 See Volvo White Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage, Inc. (In re White Motor
Credit Corp.), 75 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that section 105(a) provides
authority to sell assets free and clear of successor liability claims, and that such authority is
coextensive with Chapter 11 discharge power).
This analysis is not affected by the existence of section 524(e), which states that the discharge "does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for,
[the discharged] debt." 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1994). As the text explains, the channeling injunction does not depend on the particular debtor's eligibility for discharge. However, some courts
have seized on this provision to suggest that successor liability can not be affected by bankruptcy. See Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[D]ischarge
operates as an injunction, but only against the ... debtor."); Wilkerson v. C.O. Porter Machinery Co., 567 A.2d 598, 603-04 (NJ. Super. 1989).
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may not be paid in full in bankruptcy does not imply that successor
liability is appropriate. No unsecured creditor will be paid in full.
Receiving her due from the bankruptcy proceeding should preclude
the future claimant from a second recovery. Further rights against the
acquirer must be terminated for the collective good.
V. I PLEMENTATION

Having concluded that future claims must always be included
in external reorganization and receive equal treatment with current
creditors, and that successor liability claims must be extinguished,
we turn in this Part to issues of implementation.
A. Prospectsfor the TraditionalModel

Appropriate methods for implementing comprehensive inclusion
of future claims will vary depending on the size of the case and the
perceived magnitude of future claims liability. In terms of aligning
practice with theory, the truly difficult cases will involve small and

medium-sized companies, for which administrative expenses will always be of special concern. Outside of the large cases, the "traditional model'" 9 may be cost prohibitive. Each element of the approach-the future claims representative, claims estimation, a claims
resolution facility and associated trust-becomes relatively more expensive as the size of the estate gets smaller, but the due process and
other concerns remain the same.m°
Collectivizing some aspects of the traditional model, however,
may be possible consistent with the rights of future claimants. Institutions already exist that might be adapted for this purpose. For inSection 524(e) has been read to preclude release of third parties, such as the debtor's coobligors or guarantors, who have independent obligations to pay debts as to which the debtor
enjoys a discharge. See, e.g., American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American Hardwoods), 885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that confirmed plan could not
insulate debtor's nondebtor guarantors from liability through permanent injunction). However,
where a nondebtor third party, who might otherwise be liable as the debtor's co-obligor, contributes to the funding of the reorganization, courts have been willing to rely on their general
equitable powers to insulate that contributing third party from postbankruptey suit. See MenardSanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins, Inc.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989); In re Master Mortgage Inv.Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 935 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (enumerating factors justifying
injunction insulating nondebtor third party, including (1) nondebtor's contribution of substantial
assets to reorganization and (2) fact that suit against the contributing nondebtor would deplete
estate assets because of an identity of interest between the debtor and the nondebtor third party).
with external reorganization, of course, the acquirer funds the entire reorganization through its
payment of the purchase price for the business. The threat of postbankruptcy successor liability
diminishes that pool of estate assets. See generallyRalph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and
Complex Litigation:A CriticalReappraisalof Non-DebtorReleases in Chapter11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959.
9
23 See supraPart lII(C)(1).
240See supraPart M(C)(2).
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stance, while appointment of a future claims representative may not
be cost-justified in each case, 241 perhaps a panel system could be devised, similar to the current system of panel trustees for Chapter 7

cases. The small cases may not be lucrative for a "panel future claims
representative," but a balance of small and larger cases could provide
sufficient compensation to entice lawyers to want to serve. 242
Estimation as well need not be an extravagant proceeding, but
might be tailored to what the estate can bear. As resort to claims estimation increases, one would hope that more accurate, less expensive
methods will develop. 243 No estimation will be perfect in any event.
As long as the procedure chosen provides reasonable accuracy and
does not systematically bias the outcome in either direction, it may be
a legitimate exercise of bankruptcy powers. 244
The same may be said for the claims resolution mechanism. The
costs of full-blown nonbankruptcy litigation "may make little sense
241

Whether due process requires appointment of a future claims representative in bank-

ruptcy is an unsettled question. Compare Ralph R. Mabey & Jamie Andra Gavrin, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Discharge of Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 745, 781
(1993) ("Mullane usually mandates ... the appointment of a future claims representative in
order to provide future claims access to a court hearing."), with Frank R. Kennedy & Gerald K.
Smith, PostconfirmationIssues: The Effects of Confirmationand PostconfirmationProceedings,
44 S.C. L. REv. 621, 692 (1993) ("It is ... arguable whether either [the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments] embraces the notion that a representative must always be appointed to represent
the claims of unknown claimants."). However, implementing the traditional approach without
representation for future claimants seems problematic. It would seem, for example, that future
claimants would have to be represented in any estimation proceeding purporting to limit their
recoveries by capping the debtor's aggregate liability. See supra note 103 and accompanying
text.
242 Chapter 7 trustee fees are tied to the level of disbursements made in a given case. See 11
U.S.C. § 326(a) (1994) (describing fee schedule for Chapter 7 trustee). Because most Chapter7
cases are "no-asset" cases, the trustee is paid only a nominal fee for her services in those cases.
Most cases are therefore not lucrative for a panel trustee, but the compensation from the "asset"
cases ultimately makes up for having to administer the "no-asset" cases. See Warren, supranote
55, at 364-65 (describing cross-subsidization of trustees' fees).
243 See generally David S. Salsburg & Jack F. Williams, A StatisticalApproach to Claims
Estimation in Bankruptcy, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1119, 1139 (1997) (describing progressive
construction of statistical models for claims estimation based on past outcomes).
244As Professor Jackson notes:
It may be in the interests of all the claimants to expedite the [claims liquidation] process and thereby scale down its costs. For that reason a bankruptcy system might legitimately adopt its own procedures for estimating the expected value of a claim if
successful and the probability of its success. Although the normal nonbankruptcy
trial procedures may be watered down or eliminated, as long as there is no bias in the
direction of estimation, then there is no particular reason to think that the value of
those nonbankruptcy procedural rights has been interfered with.
JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrTS, supranote 56, at 45.
In addition, formal estimation may not always be necessary. In some circumstances, acquirers might be willing to purchase businesses subject to overhanging future liabilities if they
could get comfortable with the potential range of costs. Formal fixing or capping of the liability
may therefore not be necessary, either to preserve going concern value or to assure compensation to future claimants. Based on this idea, I have proposed a low-cost approach to treatment of
future claims in external reorganization infra at Part V(B).

1999] FUTURE CLAIMS AND SUCCESSOR LJABILITYINBANKRUPTCY

499

when the resulting claim will receive only ten cents on the dollar ....
The relatively fixed costs ... associated with nonbankruptcy claim
liquidation procedures may loom unduly large when translated into
the bankruptcy forum."2 45 The streamlined claims resolution mechanisms adopted in the large cases, while perhaps not exemplary in all
respects, may at least provide some lessons for smaller cases. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, for example, would seem to
make eminent sense in terms of transaction cost savings.4 As with
future claims representation, the claims resolution function could be
collectivized and cross-subsidized, with staffing either by private parties or public officials.
The cost of the claims resolution process, of course, will turn in
part on the nature of the tort and the complexity of the eligibility criteria set as part of the reorganization plan. As with any administrative
or adjudicative process, attempting relatively finer distinctions will
generally result in relatively greater resolution costs. Transaction cost
considerations should therefore inform not only the structuring of the
claims resolution process but also the determination of substantive
eligibility criteria.247
With respect to the payment trust, collectivized administration
seems to hold the most promise. Each case involving future claims
does not require its own separate asset management and distribution
248
system. Once the level of future claimants' pro rata recovery is set,
a claims resolution procedure put in place, and estate assets set aside,
asset management and payment of claims are simply investment and
administrative functions, respectively, requiring no exercise of legal
discretion on the part of administrators.2 9 Public and private institutions already exist that perform similar functions. Insurance and trust
companies sell similar services in the private sector. As the legal
5

24 JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 56,
24 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
27 In the A.H. Robins bankruptcy, for example,

at 45.

the claims resolution facility offered claimants a menu of procedural options with more expensive claims requiring more information and
more process. See supra note 104. "The more compensation sought by a claimant, the more
information the fund required." McGovern, supranote 107, at 682. In this manner, the fund let
claimants "self-select the optimal combination of price and transaction costs." Id.
248 After estimation of aggregate future claims liability, discounted to present value, the
payout ratio for current and future claimants is set simply by dividing asset sale proceeds-net
of administrative expenses and other priority claims-by the total amount of current and future
claims.
249 This is not to suggest that management of the trust assets would simply be mechanical.
Different investment strategies may affect recoveries for some future claimants, depending on
when their respective claims mature. However, assumptions concerning reasonable investment
returns were presumably incorporated into the future claims estimation process, in order to
determine the proper amount of estate assets to allocate to future claimants. A prudent investment strategy and corresponding investment guidelines would seem to be uncontroversial in this
context.
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system adapts to address future claims issues more coherently and
comprehensively, demand for low-cost solutions will no doubt increase. Trust and insurance products designed specifically for future
claims administration and compensation may not be too far off.250
Bankruptcy trustees perform similar functions as well. Trustees
in Chapter 13 consumer cases and Chapter 7 liquidation cases hold
and manage estate assets and disburse innumerable small payments to commercial and other creditors. And these systems are
self-supporting.25' The increasing likelihood of the existence and
recognition of future claims in smaller business bankruptcies suggests that a government institution for collective asset management
and distribution on behalf of future claimants may be appropriate.
B. One Alternative: Commensurate DiscountedAssumption
The traditional model may not be the only option for addressing
future claims. One plausible alternative, which I call Commensurate
Discounted Assumption ("CDA"), may avoid the costs of formal estimation of future claims liability and the expense of establishing and
maintaining a trust to distribute future payments. A future claims representative may also be unnecessary in some instances.
1. The Idea
Under CDA, the acquirer simply assumes the obligation to pay
future claims as they mature and are liquidated-but at a discount.
Each future claimant would be entitled to pro rata payment of its
claim from the acquirer, at a percentage commensurate with current
creditors' actual recoveries from distribution of sale proceeds under
the liquidating plan. The required percentage payout to future claimants would be determined implicitly, based on the results of negotiation among the acquirer, the debtor and current creditors over the purchase price for the business. Whatever percentage recovery is received by current creditors based on a pro rata distribution of all sale
proceeds among them, that percentage recovery will also determine
the extent of the acquirer's liability and future claimants' entitlement.
For example, if current claims of $70 million share $7 million in
the bankruptcy distribution, that 10% payout also sets the acquirer's
commensurate liability-and the "CDA payout ratio"-for future
250See

Keating, supranote 58, at 1101-02 (suggesting that assets set aside for future claim-

ants be used to purchase insurance on their behalf, instead of simply placing such funds in trust).
25 See Warren, supra note 55, at 364-65 (describing profit making by U.S. Trustee system
and fee system for private trustees).
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claims. As future claims mature and are liquidated, the acquirer must
compensate each at 10% of the amount of its liquidated claim.
An acquirer would certainly discount its bid price to account for
this assumed CDA liability, but this should not prejudice current
creditors, since any discount would only reflect the cost of payments
to future claimants commensurate with those received by current
claimants. The common pool represented by the asset sale proceeds
would contract, but only by the amount of pro rata payments to which
future claimants are entitled.
Assume, for example, that the acquirer estimates the operational
value of the business at $10 million. It estimates aggregate future
claims liability at $30 million in present value terms, and there are
current claims totaling $70 million. Under these assumptions, and
assuming no secured debt, and administrative and other priority
claims to be zero (purely for ease of computation), the acquirer will
not bid the "full price" of $10 million for the business. Instead it will
bid $7 million, taking a $3 million discount for future claims liability.
Because it estimates that future claims constitute 30% of the debtor's
unsecured claims, it will reserve 30%
of its "full price" bid to com2
arise.
they
as
claims
future
pensate
As a result of the acquirer's $7 million bid, current claims of $70
million will be paid 10% of their claims, which also sets the acquirer's commensurate liability for the estimated $30 million in future
claims. Over time, the acquirer will end up paying a present value of
$3 million in order to retire future claims as they mature, each at 10%
of its claim. In this way, the "full price' of $10 million is shared
ratably among current and future claims.
In effect, this process allows protection of future claimants' interests through the bargaining of current creditors, the debtor and the
acquirer over the purchase price of the business. Current creditors
will push for a high valuation of the going concern, with a minimal
discount for any future claims liability, thereby maximizing returns to
themselves. The acquirer's approach will be just the opposite. It will
wish to pay as little as possible for the going concern, and to that end
will claim a heavy burden of future claims liability. Because the ultimate percentage payout received by current creditors will affect the
acquirer's assumed obligation to pay future claimants, the acquirer
has additional incentive to bid low.
The advantages to this approach are several. First, the parties in
interest can avoid the costs of a formal estimation proceeding. Parties
-52 The

acquirer will also attempt to discount for its anticipated transaction costs of liqui-

dating future claims as they mature.
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will certainly have to invest resources privately estimating future
claims liability, which will inform their negotiation over the sale
price. However, no formal estimation process need be conducted, and
no current representation for future claimants need necessarily be
procured. As long as current creditors have a large enough stake in
the outcome to police or participate in the bargaining over the purchase price,2s3 future claimants are protected by current creditors' desire to maximize their own returns. This approach also eliminates the
need for a special mechanism to effect future distributions. Future
claims would simply be paid by the going concern-that is, the acquirer-as they arise and are liquidated.2-4
Future claims are not prejudiced, as their recoveries have not been
limited by any formal estimation. Only the acquirer's commensurate
liability-and the corresponding CDA payout ratio-is set as a result
of the bankruptcy sale. Each future claimant's actual recovery from
the acquirer would be determined upon the claim's liquidation by
multiplying the liquidated face amount by the CDA payout ratio. 5
This bargaining structure in effect uses a crude market mechanism
to substitute for future claims estimation. It allows parties with their
own money at stake to negotiate a deal that also determines treatment
of future claimants. Because it is their money at stake, we can have
some confidence that current creditors and the acquirer will be vigorous in their negotiation. And whatever deal is struck, future claimants
will receive equal treatment with current creditors, discounted to present value.
Put another way, the acquirer pays the "full" purchase price for the
business in multiple installments. The first installment is paid to the
Chapter 11 estate in order to acquire formal title to the business. This
first installment goes to pay current creditors, who are the debtor's
residual claimants whose identities have been determined as of the
date of plan confirmation. Further installments are paid to future
claimants-that is, the residual claimants whose identities are determined postbankruptcy-as their claims mature.
2. Limitationsand Implications
Certain caveats apply to this CDA approach.
253 Appointment of a creditors' committee would also serve this function. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1102(a)(1) (1994).
2 A streamlined claims resolution process could also be set up in bankruptcy as part of the
liquidating plan.
25 Building on the example in the text, the future claimant whose injury has matured and
whose claim is liquidated at a face amount of $100,000 will be paid 10% of that, or $10,000, by
the acquirer.
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a. Due Process
One obvious caveat relates to due process. Absent appointment

of a future claims representative, it is unclear whether the interests
of future claimants could be said to have been adequately represented in the bargaining process. No party to the bankruptcy
would have exactly the same set of interests as future claimants.6
On the other hand, as long as the particular circumstances in a
given case impart confidence that the debtor, current creditors and the
acquirer bargained at arm's length over the purchase price for the
business, then the interests of future claimants would seem to have
been protected. Future claimants' interests coincide with those of
current creditors in holding out for the highest possible purchase
price, since that dollar figure provides the numerator for the fraction
that forms the CDA payout ratio. Future claimants would also want
to minimize the denominator of that fraction, which is simply the
dollar amount of allowed current claims. Presumably the debtor and
current creditors may be relied upon to raise allowance issues with
respect to current claims, since current creditors stand to improve
their recoveries to the extent they can eliminate other current creditors
claiming a share in the sale proceeds. As long as no side payments
are allowed from the acquirer to current creditors, and as long as current creditors have enough stake in the outcome to participate, it
would appear that the bargaining interests of current creditors also
serve to protect the interests of future claimants.

256

Cf Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,43 (1940) (opining that absent parties may be bound

where they are adequately represented by present parties). "[W]here the interests of those not
joined are of the same class as the interests of those who are, and where it is considered that the
latter fairly represent the former in the prosecution of the litigation... the court will proceed to
a decree." Id. at 41-42.
257

See id. at 42 ("[Tjhere has been a failure of due process only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent
parties who are to be bound by it.").
Notice should also be given. Some future claimants may be identifiable, and as to them
actual notice is appropriate. See Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491
(1988) (holding that creditor known or reasonably ascertainable is entitled to notice by mail or
other means of actual notice); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Aguiar (In re Waterman S.S. Corp.), 157
B.R. 220, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing notice requirements with respect to known versus
unidentifiable future claimants). Publication notice should also be made for unidentifiable
claimants. While no future claimant may have any incentive to participate, see supra note 10
and accompanying text, to the extent practicable, future claimants should be given an opportunity to appear, if for no other purpose than to monitor the transaction that will affect their potential future recoveries.
Ultimately, if there is doubt concerning due process questions, a future claims representative could be appointed. For example, if future claims liability far outweighed current claims
liability, current creditors might have no strong incentive to police the bargaining over the pur-
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Due process protection for future claimants is certainly an important issue. However, it would be ironic if due process constraints
were construed to defeat the interests of the supposed beneficiaries of
those constraints. 8 If due process concerns preclude bankruptcy
participation by future claimants in the small cases because the traditional approach is cost prohibitive and no other approach will do,
many excluded future claimants may end up with no recovery at all.
State law remedies may be nonexistent. That consideration should
inform any due process inquiry.
b. SuccessorLiability Issues
The CDA approach is at heart a species of successor liability, but
with a bankruptcy twist. As such, it is susceptible to criticisms of the
same flavor as those aimed at common law successor liability.2 9
Asking an acquirer to assume open-ended liability may kill any
deal.
The parties' respective assessments of the present value of
aggregate future claims liability may differ by a wide margin. To the
extent that the aggregate amount of liability is difficult to predict
within an acceptable range of uncertainty, the parties may not be able
to settle on a mutually acceptable price for the business.
On the other hand, with the liability discounted, the acceptable
range of uncertainty becomes proportionally greater, since each dollar
of unexpected liability is paid only a proportionate amount based on
the CDA payout ratio. The effect of scaling down the liability is that
the deal can tolerate a higher degree of uncertainty than outside of
bankruptcy.
Moreover, the CDA approach is not mandatory. It merely provides one alternative for the parties to structure a deal that also accounts for future claims. Under my prescription, compensating future
claimants is mandatory. But whether that obligation is paid by the

chase price for the business. In that situation, appointment of a future claims representative
might be necessary.
25 See generally Roe, Mass Tort, supra note 2, at 898-904 (noting possible detriment to
future claimants' interests from too formalistic a construction of due process requirements).
259 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
260"Open-ended" may be a bit of an overstatement. An acquirer may limit its CDA liability
simply by placing the acquired business in a separate corporation and incurring secured debt.
Liability would thereby be limited to the consideration paid for the business, net of the secured
debt. See LoPucki, The Death of Liability, supra note 37, at 14-23 (describing liability avoidance strategies of secured debt and multiple incorporation). Of course, there may be financing
issues that make secured debt undesirable. There may be operational reasons to integrate the
acquired business into the acquirer's existing operations, in which case separate incorporation
might not be effective to quarantine the liability of the acquired business. See In re Palmer
Trading, Inc., 695 F.2d 1012, 1017 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing commingling of business affairs
among affiliates as factor in favor of piercing corporate veil).
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estate directly-as occurs under the traditional approach--or the acquirer assumes it, is up to the parties to decide. Presumably, whichever route is cheaper in transaction cost terms would be preferred.
Any approach attempting formally to cap future claims liability would
require an estimation proceeding at which a future claims representative would participate. But that route may be cost prohibitive. The
CDA approach may be the cheaper option. In any event, current
creditors may have no choice, in the face of acquirer trepidation conwhatever discounted sale price
cerning CDA liability, to consent to
261
necessary to sell the going concern.
c. Transaction Costs in Claims Resolution
Another effect of scaling down future claims liability is that transaction costs become a relatively greater deterrent to future claimants'
pursuit of their claims. If the CDA payout ratio is low, future claimants may not find it worthwhile to pursue pennies on the dollar for
their tort harms.
In this situation, the design of a low-cost claims resolution
mechanism may be critical to ensuring that compensation is ultimately delivered. Otherwise, the acquirer's CDA liability is
merely theoretical. The acquirer, the debtor and current creditors
could negotiate the sale of the business under the comfortable assumption that few future claimants would ever come forward. The
going concern sale in bankruptcy would therefore, as a practical
matter, leave future claimants with no remedy.
C. PolicingInclusion of Future Claims
Even if a costless scheme could be devised for inclusion of future
claims, there remains the general problem of mandating its use. Even
if the CDA approach "works," no one before the court may have any
interest in raising it or proposing any compensation for future
claims. 2
In some cases, the acquirer may insist that future claims be addressed. 263 It may seek a CDA order, as that would reduce its liability
261Under my proposal, piecemeal liquidation is no more attractive an alternative, since current creditors will have to share with future claims even in that event. See supra note 182.
262Appointment of a future claims representative does not occur spontaneously. See supra
note 147 and accompanying text. Of course, future liabilities might arise that could not have
been anticipated at the time of bankruptcy. That these liabilities were ignored in bankruptcy is
understandable. They present a much more difficult question than anticipated products liability.
A considered discussion of this question must be deferred for another day.
263In Piper,for example, it was the acquirer's insistence that led to appointment of a future
claims representative. See supra note 130.
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as compared to full-blown successor liability outside of bankruptcy. 264
However, that incentive is only as good as the threat of successor liability, which as we have seen may be spotty.
If the external reorganization fails to make provision for future
claims, and foreseeable future claims nevertheless appear, the future
claimant should be able to seek relief from the bankruptcy court
against the acquirer. At the least, the court should imply the acquirer's CDA obligation to the future claimant. 265 The future claimant's position as a residual owner of the business in bankruptcy entities her to demand equal treatment with her fellow owners-that is,
the other unsecured creditors who have already received their distributions through external reorganization. Depending on the equities of
the case, the court might impose other remedies as well. 266
On the other hand, merely imposing CDA liability after the fact
may be too small a stick to assure inclusion of future claims in all
cases. It provides no ex ante deterrent to ignoring future claims. A
more aggressive approach might deny the acquirer the benefit of any
discount in liability. In other words, a future claimant not accorded
acceptable treatment in external reorganization would have the right
to collect 100-cent dollars from the going concern in the acquirer's
hands, purely as a matter of bankruptcy law. This remedy in fact parallels the established result in internal reorganization for a claim not
afforded due process: the claim survives against the going concern.267
That approach admittedly places a premium on careful due diligence by the acquirer. However, that fact by itself should not detain
us. Although prospective acquirers may wish to shy away from entanglement in the details of the bankruptcy proceeding, that position
is now untenable. Courts have endorsed successor liability to protect
future claimants following a bankruptcy sale that ignored their rights.
Acquirers have no choice but to concern themselves with future
claims in bankruptcy.

2

64 See supranotes 130-31 and accompanying text.
265 Cf. Jackson, TranslatingAssets and Liabilities,supranote

80, at 96 ("Existing claimants

may use bankruptcy to discharge [future] tort liability at an appraisal that they (or the debtor)
know to be too low; and the tort doctrine of successor liability may exist to minimize this spedes of misbehavior as well.").
266 For example, the debtor's schedules are signed and filed under penalty of perjury.
See 11
U.S.C. app. Official Bankruptcy Form 6 (1994 & Supp. 1 1997). Once it becomes clear that
future claimants are creditors, debtors should be required to schedule them, at least generally, so
that the court and the U.S. Trustee are on notice that future claims are an issue.
267See supra note 145.
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VI. CONCLUSION: IMPERFECr SOLUTIONS

I have described an approach to future claims in external reorganization that mandates their inclusion in the bankruptcy proceeding and the extinguishment of any successor liability rights.
The fundamental point is that future claimants, as creditors of the
debtor-manufacturer, must be treated as such in the manufacturer's
external reorganization. Especially where a going concern survives to generate value for investors, future claimants are entitled
to their equal share of that value.
Given the extant iegimes of corporate and tort law, I have attempted to construct a balanced and conceptually consistent approach to treatment of future claims. It is unlikely that any structure exists to satisfy fully all the competing demands of predictability and finality, financial and economic rehabilitation, adequate
and efficient compensation, and fairness. However rough and inelegant may be the accommodation described herein, it results
from the conflicting aims of the various doctrines.
That goals may conflict, however, does not suggest that improvements can not be made in their accommodation. To date,
accommodation of conflicting goals has largely been at the expense of future claimants. The temptation to balance competing
interests on the backs of future claimants is overwhelming. They
are faceless parties with only abstract future rights to assert. The
costs of including them tempt us to ignore them instead. Especially outside of the large cases, cost-effective solutions may be
elusive.
Although harms to future claimants are remote in time, they are
real nonetheless. The costs and consequences of delayed tort liabilities can no longer be ignored. One might take issue with the
tort law system as currently configured, but reform if undertaken
should be done explicitly, and not through manipulation of corporate and bankruptcy rules. In the meantime, corporate and bankruptcy law ought to accord future claimants their due. I have proposed one possible approach, which clearly sacrifices some predictability and finality in favor of compensating future claims.
Other approaches may appear as well. We can be sure, though,
that progress will elude us until we decide to take future claims
seriously.

